sent a stern letter to Ben-Gurion demanding that Israel withdraw from Egypt. Israel’s
refusal to heed the UN resolutions, Eisenhower said, “would seriously undermine the
urgent efforts being made by the United Nations to restore peace in the Middle East,
and could not but bring about the condemnation of Israel as a violator of the principles
as well as the directives of the United Nations.” An even blunter warning arrived from
Soviet prime minister Nikolai Bulganin, who threatened rocket attacks against the three
aggressor countries and suggested that “volunteers” would be sent to aid Egypt.
Britain and France began withdrawing their troops from Egypt on November
21, but Israel retreated slowly and grudgingly, starting with a pullback from the
Suez Canal in early December. At first, Israel insisted on holding on to the Gaza
Strip along with Sharm al-Sheikh and a strip of land adjacent to the Gulf of Aqaba
to ensure its shipping rights. Another potential diplomatic crisis arose early in 1957
when Israel appeared to be ignoring repeated UN resolutions demanding its com-
plete withdrawal behind the 1949 armistice lines. On February 4, 1957, Eisenhower
sent another letter to Ben-Gurion stating that continued Israeli disregard for UN
resolutions would “seriously damage relations between Israel and UN members,
including the United States.” Under congressional pressure, Eisenhower later soft-
ened his stance somewhat, saying in a nationwide radio and television address on
February 20 that Israel must withdraw unconditionally and rely on assurances from
the United States and the United Nations that its right of transit in the Gulf of
Aqaba would be protected. Israel finally withdrew from Gaza and Sharm al-Sheikh
in March 1957 under a Canadian-negotiated compromise providing for the sta-
tioning of UN monitoring forces in both locations. Shortly after the withdrawal,
Egypt sent civil administrators (but not troops) into Gaza in violation of UN res-
olutions. Egypt also announced that it would continue its ban on Israeli use of the
Suez Canal.
Without question, the principal losers in the Suez crisis were Britain and
France, which suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat when the superpowers forced
them to back down from their attempt to reassert their imperial roles in the Mid-
dle East. The crisis contributed to the collapse of the French Fourth Republic two
years later and emboldened rebels in Algeria fighting to gain independence from
Paris. (They succeeded in 1962.) Britain, which had dominated Egypt and strate-
gic points in the Middle East for much of a century, withdrew entirely from the
region in 1971.
The results were more mixed for Egypt and Israel. The crisis exposed the weak-
ness and incompetence of the Egyptian army, and the country’s new Soviet-built air
force was destroyed. Even so, Nasser deftly converted military defeat into political vic-
tory: He survived in office, retained control of the canal, and strengthened his posi-
tion in Egypt and the broader Arab world. Moreover, Nasser exploited the imperial-
ist intervention to foment a wave of Arab nationalism that crested two years later with
the formation of the United Arab Republic, the short-lived political union between
Egypt and Syria.
Israel achieved two of its strategic objectives: freedom of navigation for Israel-
bound ships in the Strait of Tiran and an end to Egyptian-sponsored guerrilla attacks
from Gaza. Nasser remained in power, however, as a potent symbol unifying the Arab
world against Israel, and Ben-Gurion’s dreams of an Israeli-controlled Sinai Peninsula
were dashed (for the time being). The Suez crisis led to one of the lowest points in
82 ARABS AND ISRAELIS