against Israel in collusion with Syria. Although pleased with the Egyptian army’s per-
formance in the early stages of that war, Sadat nonetheless realized that Israel could
not be defeated militarily and that some kind of accommodation with the Jewish state
was inevitable. By the middle of 1977, Sadat was actively reaching out to Israel, at
first indirectly, through the United States, and then directly. At each stage, Sadat
ignored or overrode the objections of senior aides who thought he was moving too
quickly, acting too independently of other Arab leaders, and making too many con-
cessions to the Israelis.
In October 1977, after Carter appealed to Sadat for help in restarting long-stalled
regional talks, the Egyptian president decided on a much bolder step: a trip to
Jerusalem, where he would make his case directly to Israel’s leaders and its people.
Over the opposition of some aides, Begin responded with an invitation. Sadat flew to
Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, his arrival marking one of the most dramatic events
in recent Middle East history.
Sadat told Israeli leaders that his visit was simply to advance the cause of the Pales-
tinians, not to negotiate a separate peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. In his land-
mark speech to the Knesset on November 20, Sadat listed several requirements for
peace between Israel and the Arabs, among them “secure boundaries” for Israel but
also Israel’s “complete withdrawal” from the territories occupied in 1967, including
East Jerusalem. Despite the symbolic importance of the occasion, Israelis interpreted
Sadat’s speech as confrontational rather than conciliatory. Begin responded in kind,
saying that, while Israel was willing to negotiate with the Arabs, it would never give
up East Jerusalem.
Sadat’s gambit highlighted yet again the stark differences between Arab and Israeli
self-interests and historical perspectives. Even so, the public aspects of the visit—a smil-
ing Begin greeting a courtly Sadat—showed Egyptians and Israelis that their perceived
enemies were humans, with similar hopes and fears, not the monsters portrayed by
official propaganda. The event also created an opening for a serious diplomatic process,
though it failed to win over hard-liners on either side, particularly among Arabs who
feared that Sadat had shattered their unity against Israel. Officials from several Arab
states, along with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), met in Libya on
December 2 to declare an economic boycott against Egypt.
A reciprocal visit by Begin to Ismailia, Egypt, on December 25, 1977, appeared
to result in a hardening of positions, making clear the necessity of an outside media-
tor to break the impasse. At this point, the United States actively entered the picture,
starting with a meeting between Carter and Sadat in Egypt on January 4, 1978. This
meeting produced the Aswan Declaration, a joint statement that referred to the “legit-
imate rights of the Palestinian people,” including their right to determine “their own
future.” The statement marked the United States’ first formal embrace of a formula
implying some kind of self-governance by the Palestinians. Carter also appeared to side
with Egypt on two other significant matters. After a meeting with Sadat at the Camp
David presidential retreat in Maryland on February 3, 1978, Carter said that UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 242 required Israel to withdraw from all—not just some—
Arab territories, and he denounced as “illegal” Israel’s construction of Jewish settle-
ments on these lands.
U.S.-mediated efforts to bridge differences between the Egyptians and the Israelis
made little headway during mid-1978, leading Carter at the end of July to take a gam-
ARABS AND ISRAELIS 119