The Arab League Beirut Summit
DOCUMENT IN CONTEXT
In the decades after the June 1967 War, Arab leaders moved slowly—almost imper-
ceptibly at times—to come to terms with Israel’s existence and its control of what
Arabs considered to be their lands. This gradual shift could be seen in various state-
ments made during regular Arab summits, starting with the “three noes”—”no peace
with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it”—at the Khartoum sum-
mit in 1967 and continuing through the 1982 declaration in Fez, Morocco, that cau-
tiously suggested an acknowledgment of Israel’s existence (Khartoum Declaration,
p. 108; Fez Declaration, p. 137).
Yet another step came early in 2002, a time not particularly auspicious for Mid-
dle Eastern peace endeavors. The al-Aqsa intifada, the second Palestinian uprising
against Israeli occupation, was in its third year, and the United States had just begun
the political and military buildup that would culminate in the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq in March 2003. Despite, or perhaps because of, these events, Saudi Arabia’s de
facto ruler, Crown Prince Abdallah, chose this time to push for a new Arab opening
to Israel. Abdallah caused a worldwide stir in February when he told New York Times
columnist Tom Friedman that he was working on a peace plan under which Arab
nations would “normalize” relations with Israel in exchange for several steps by Israel,
including full withdrawal from the Arab territories it had occupied and acceptance of
a Palestinian state. Abdallah’s statement was the first hint by any prominent Arab
leader of a regionwide plan for peace with Israel.
Abdallah carried his plan to a scheduled summit meeting of Arab leaders starting
on March 27 in Beirut. In a speech to his colleagues that was televised in Israel and
the Arab world Abdallah said that if Israel “abandons the policy of force and oppres-
sion and embraces true peace, we will not hesitate to accept the right of the Israeli
people to live in security with the people of the region.”
The next day, Arab leaders endorsed Abdallah’s plan—the Arab Peace Initiative—
which repeated standard calls for Israel to withdraw from Arab territories and to accept
a Palestinian state but also contained an unprecedented reciprocal offer. If Israel took
those steps, the leaders said, they would “consider the Arab-Israeli conflict at an end
and enter into a peace agreement between them and Israel while achieving security for
all the states of the region.” They also would “establish normal relations with Israel in
the context of this comprehensive peace.”
The exceptionally conciliatory nature of this language was coupled with standard
Arab rhetoric against Israel. The accompanying Beirut Declaration contained the same
offer of peace while also condemning Israeli “massacres” of Palestinians and praising Pales-
tinian “martyrs,” a term that includes suicide bombers and others who die in the act of
attacking Israel and civilians killed by Israelis. Three key Arab leaders did not attend the
summit: Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Jordan’s King Abdallah II, and Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat. Israel had confined Arafat to his government compound in Ramal-
lah, offering to allow him to attend the summit on the condition that he not return.
156 ARABS AND ISRAELIS