encouraged the secret talks, which at first were unofficial but became more serious
when Israeli diplomats joined the discussions early in 1993. Of even more importance,
the continuing strife of the Palestinian intifada had changed the political landscape,
forcing both sides to accept the need for concessions. The PLO had begun losing pub-
lic support to the more militant Hamas and Islamic Jihad factions, while Rabin felt
pressure to show results from the negotiations he had promised during his election
campaign.
The Oslo talks ultimately produced the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, an agreement completed on August 24 by Peres and PLO
negotiator Ahmed Qureia. The Israeli cabinet approved the accord on August 30 by
a unanimous vote, with two abstentions—a remarkable degree of unity on the first
formal agreement between Israel and the PLO.
Peres and Mahmoud Abbas, chief aide to PLO chairman Yasir Arafat, officially
signed the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, at a White House cere-
mony presided over by President Bill Clinton, with Rabin and Arafat looking on. In
many ways, the substance of the agreement was overshadowed by the symbolism of
the occasion, notably, the sight of old foes Rabin and Arafat shaking hands, an action
that would have been inconceivable for either of them in times past. Four days ear-
lier, the leaders had exchanged letters that amounted to formal recognition: Arafat rec-
ognized Israel’s right to exist as a state, and Rabin acknowledged the PLO as the rep-
resentative of the Palestinian people, but did not explicitly support the idea of a
Palestinian state.
Better known as the Oslo Accord, the Declaration of Principles was simply that—
a broad-brush of generalities intended to banish the long era of hostility between
Israelis and Palestinians but not meant as a definitive answer to how that would be
accomplished. The basic elements called for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from parts of
the occupied territories, to be replaced by “self-government arrangements” for the
Palestinians during a “transitional period” to last no more than five years. Specific
details were to be negotiated under a rigid timetable, beginning with a two-month
limit on talks leading to the withdrawal of the Israeli military from the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank town of Jericho. The most controversial issues—the status of Jerusalem,
the rights of Palestinian refugees, and the fate of Jewish settlements in the territories—
were mentioned only as subjects to be addressed in future “permanent status” talks.
In essence, the intent of the Oslo agreement was to buy Israel peace with the Pales-
tinians, to give Arafat and the PLO the right to immediately govern part of the terri-
tories and more later, and to give the Palestinian people the hope for self-governance
and a brighter future that had been lacking for many years. Following a general con-
cept outlined in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East negotiated by Israel and
Egypt at Camp David fifteen years earlier, the Oslo Accords adopted a step-by-step
approach: Palestinians would be given progressively greater authority in the territories
as Israel withdrew, but each step would be subject to continuing negotiation and to
events on the ground.
In a broader sense, the Oslo Accords represented an acknowledgment by each side
that its long-time dream of controlling all of historic Palestine had died: Rabin reluc-
tantly admitted that Israel would have to relinquish most of the Gaza Strip and at
least some of the West Bank, and Arafat accepted the inevitability of governing a tiny
Palestine overshadowed by a much more powerful Israel. The agreement also opened
214 ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS