Toward Arab Independence
DOCUMENT IN CONTEXT
Few aspects of modern Middle Eastern history have been as hotly disputed as the cor-
respondence of 1915–1916 between Sharif Hussein ibn Ali, a leading Arab figure of
the time, and Sir Henry McMahon, Britain’s chief diplomatic representative in the
region. Many Arab leaders and some Western historians contend that the correspon-
dence committed Britain to supporting Arab control of key territories, including the
portion of Palestine that is now Israel. Most British officials, Jewish leaders, and other
historians insist that the correspondence was deliberately vague and made no such com-
mitment to the Arabs. The dispute has never been resolved and probably never will
be. In any event, the correspondence remains an important marker, in part because
many Arabs still view it as demonstrating Western treachery.
Hussein, the amir of Mecca, initiated the correspondence with McMahon, the
British high commissioner in Egypt, which at the time was under British control. In
a letter dated July 14, 1915, Hussein demanded that Britain acknowledge the inde-
pendence of an Arab kingdom (to be headed by Hussein) comprising most of the
Arabian Peninsula, the provinces then known as Greater Syria (consisting of present-
day Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria), and much of present-day Iraq. In making
this demand, Hussein was essentially endorsing proposals advanced by other Arab fig-
ures (including dissident officers in the army of the Ottoman Empire) who hoped to
gain support from either the British or the Ottomans for the idea of an independent
Arab state.
Hussein’s letter created controversy among senior British officials, some of whom
saw it as an opportunity to gain Arab support in World War I, while others opposed
any dealings with Arabs, whom they regarded as untrustworthy and inconsequential
to the war. Officials in London eventually authorized McMahon to send Hussein a
generally positive reply.
After another exchange of letters, McMahon’s reply came in a vaguely worded and
generally noncommittal letter, dated October 24, 1915, that endorsed “the indepen-
dence of the Arabs” in some but not all of the regions Hussein had cited. McMahon
excluded the coastal region of present-day Syria and most of Lebanon by arguing that
the districts west of a line stretching from the town of Aleppo on the north to Da-
mascus in the south “cannot be said to be purely Arab.” He did not say as much, but
this exclusion was intended to preserve the option for France, Britain’s war-time ally,
to assume control of that part of Syria and Lebanon.
McMahon also excluded from a potential Arab state what he called the “districts”
of Mersina (now Mersin in southwestern Turkey) and Alexandretta (now Iskenderun,
a Mediterranean port city in Turkey). In addition, McMahon wrote that Britain would
have to maintain what he called “special administrative arrangements” for the provinces
of Baghdad and Basra, much of what is present-day Iraq. He did not define what he
meant by these arrangements, though the language almost certainly was intended to
assert that Britain should control those parts of Iraq. McMahon also did not directly
8 FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST