pain that I feel at this act is equal only to the measure of resolved recognition that it
was something that had to be done.
We are embarking on a new path which has many risks, but also a ray of hope
for all of us.
With the help of God, may this path be one of unity and not division, of mutual
respect, and not animosity between brothers, of unconditional love, and not baseless
hatred.
I will do my utmost to ensure that it will be so.
SOURCE:State of Israel, Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Sharon’s Statement on the Day of the Implementation
of the Disengagement Plan,” http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2005/08/speech150805.htm.The Hamas Government
DOCUMENT IN CONTEXT
The death of long-time Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat in November 2004 unleashed
powerful centrifugal forces that within thirty months brought chaos to the Gaza Strip
and threatened a similar result in the West Bank. Rampant violence, political infight-
ing, and economic decline transformed hopes of a viable Palestinian state into a poten-
tial nightmare.
Palestinian society’s increasing polarization—between the secular nationalism that
Arafat had championed and an increasingly popular Islamist approach symbolized by
Hamas—emerged as one of the most visible causes of strife in the territories. Until
the first intifada, or uprising, against Israeli occupation in the late 1980s, the vast
majority of Palestinians appeared to accept Arafat’s view that creating a national state
represented the paramount Palestinian goal. By the early 1990s Arafat came to embrace
a two-state solution that acknowledged Israel’s existence. Hamas, however, along with
a handful of smaller groups, such as Islamic Jihad, argued that Islam should be the
fundamental ideology of any Palestinian state. These groups also rejected any form of
legitimacy for Israel (Hamas’s Covenant, p. 206). In 1994, the year after Arafat, as
chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), signed the Palestinians first
peace agreement with Israel and officially recognized the Israeli government, Hamas
signaled its disapproval of that course by launching its first suicide bomb attacks against
Israel (Oslo Accords, p. 213).
Hamas had over the years built up an extensive network of schools, medical
clinics, and other social services in the Gaza Strip, where its support was greatest.
Financed largely by Iran, these services undermined public support for Arafat’s quasi-
governmental Palestinian Authority, which failed to deliver important public services
and developed a reputation for corruption and inefficiency.
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS 317