Lebanese Civil War
DOCUMENT IN CONTEXT
Two developments in the late 1960s set in motion a series of events that led to the
unraveling of Lebanon’s political and social fabric: an increasing desire by Muslims for
a fair share of the nation’s wealth and political power and the presence of guerrillas
from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other groups fighting on behalf
of Palestinian Arabs.
Lebanon’s society was highly polarized economically. The Lebanese population
consisted of Shiite Muslims, most of whom lived in slums outside Beirut or in impov-
erished rural areas in the south, and wealthier Christians and Sunni Muslims. In 1969
Kamal Jumblatt, a leader of the Druze—Arabs whose religious beliefs mixed elements
of Christianity and Islam—joined with several Muslim leaders to form the Lebanese
National Movement, a loose coalition demanding economic and political reforms. The
Maronites, the dominate community of Christians, opposed their demands. Some
prominent Maronites had their own militias, notably, Pierre Gemayel, the head of the
Phalange Party, whose militia ranked as one of the largest.
After Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the June 1967 Arab-
Israeli war, the PLO and similar groups moved into neighboring Arab nations, espe-
cially Jordan and Lebanon. From their bases in these countries, Palestinian guerrillas
launched repeated attacks against Israel, which retaliated with cross-border strikes. In
December 1968 Israeli commandos destroyed thirteen Lebanese planes at the Beirut
airport. The following year, Arab leaders meeting in Cairo worked out an agreement
under which the Lebanese government accepted the presence of the Palestinian guer-
rillas, who in turn were supposed to (but rarely did) seek permission from the gov-
ernment before launching operations against Israel.
The incident that triggered Lebanon’s descent into civil war occurred on April 13,
1975, when unknown gunmen assassinated Pierre Gemayel along with four Phalangist
militiamen. Later that same day, Phalange militia members, acting on the assumption
that the assassins were Palestinians, attacked a bus full of Palestinians, killing more
than twenty passengers. These actions sparked fierce confrontations between the Pha-
lange and Palestinians that lasted until July 1, when a cease-fire led the Palestinians to
withdraw from fighting for the rest of the year. Reflecting the underlying disputes
among the various Lebanese communities, a new and broader round of fighting
erupted in August between militia supporting Jumblatt’s Lebanese National Movement
and Christian militias, including the Phalange. Much of this fighting took place in
downtown Beirut, destroying many of the city’s famed office towers and luxury hotels.
In December, the Phalange began expelling Muslims from predominantly Christian
areas of Beirut, heightening the conflict. The following month, January 1976, the Lebanese
Forces, a group of Christian militias, attacked a Palestinian refugee camp in southern
Beirut, reportedly killing upwards of 3,000 people. The PLO, joined by Jumblatt’s mili-
tia, responded with attacks against the Christians. Meanwhile, the ineffectual Lebanese
Army disintegrated, and its soldiers and officers sided with the opposing militias.
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