headed by Abu Nidal. The declared intent of the invasion—Operation Peace for the
Galilee, launched on June 6—was to establish in southern Lebanon a twenty-five-mile-
deep security zone, which would put northern Israel (the Galilee) out of range of Pales-
tinian artillery and rocket fire. Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon had several
additional purposes in mind for the invasion, including pushing the PLO out of
Lebanon (thus weakening the organization) and supporting Bashir Gemayel, a candi-
date for president of Lebanon.
Gemayel was the son of Pierre Gemayel, a long-time leader of Lebanon’s Maronite
Christians and founder of the right-wing Phalange Party and militia. Israeli officials
expected that Bashir Gemayel, once in office, would negotiate a formal peace treaty
between Israel and Lebanon. Some historians also have cited evidence that Sharon envi-
sioned an even broader and more dramatic outcome from the invasion: pushing the
PLO back into Jordan and thereby causing the collapse of King Hussein’s government
and the transformation of Jordan into a Palestinian state. Israel would then be free to
“transfer” to that state the Palestinians living in the West Bank, thus giving Israel free
rein over that territory (Jordan Relinquishes the West Bank, p. 200).
In a June 8 speech to the Knesset justifying the invasion, Begin omitted reference
to any broader goals, saying only that Israel sought to establish the zone in southern
Lebanon free of Palestinian guerrillas and their rockets. “We want only one thing: That
no one harm our settlements in the Galilee any more, that our citizens in the Galilee
settlements will not have to choke in shelters day and night, that they will not have
to live under the threat of sudden death from the missile called a Katyusha,” he said.
Although Begin presented Israel’s invasion merely as a response to the events of
the previous few days, the extent of military operations made clear the extensive,
months-long planning of it. Ground forces moved through southern Lebanon in three
directions. In western and central Lebanon, the Israeli army quickly pushed Palestin-
ian guerrillas north of the twenty-five-mile zone and into Beirut. In the east, the army
attacked Syrian troops that had been stationed in Lebanon as Arab League peacekeepers
since 1976, and Israeli warplanes destroyed antiaircraft missiles that Syria had installed
in the Bekaa Valley. By the time a U.S.-negotiated cease-fire took effect on June 11,
Israeli forces had taken control of most of southern and central Lebanon and had sur-
rounded Beirut.
On June 14 Israel began a siege of the Lebanese capital, demanding the surren-
der of PLO forces in the western suburbs. It took nearly two months of fighting—
including nearly constant Israeli bombardment of the city—before U.S. special envoy
Philip Habib could secure another cease-fire. Under the terms of that agreement, PLO
leaders, including Chairman Yasir Arafat, and thousands of fighters left Lebanon, most
of them aboard ships bound for other Arab countries. Arafat and a core of the lead-
ership eventually headed to Tunis, where they would remain for more than a decade.
A short-term multinational force composed of troops from the United States, France,
and other countries supervised the evacuation.
The last contingent of PLO members left Lebanon on September 2, thus secur-
ing for Israel one of the prime objectives of its invasion. (Israel later claimed that
approximately 2,000 PLO fighters remained in Lebanon.) The exile of Arafat and his
top aides to Tunisia hampered the PLO for years by weakening their ties to the Pales-
tinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Israel also achieved its objective of a security zone
by stationing troops south of the Litani River alongside the Israeli-financed South
LEBANON AND SYRIA 335