If Tehran had a strategic edge as of mid-1987, it quickly disappeared in the early
months of 1988. In late February, Iraq began using the al-Hussein, an improved ver-
sion of a Scud missile. Over the course of several weeks, Iraq launched more than two
hundred of them against Iranian cities, primarily Tehran and the religious center of
Qom. Hundreds of thousands of terrified residents fled, many of them after rumors
spread of an Iraqi plan to equip the missiles with chemical weapons.
Having demoralized much of Iran’s civilian population with attacks from the air,
Iraq proceeded to launch its most successful ground operations of the war. On April
17, 1988, the Iraqi army began an offensive that quickly recaptured the Faw Penin-
sula (in extreme southeastern Iraq), which Iran had occupied for more than two years.
Iraq carried out four more large-scale military operations from late May through mid-
July that drove all remaining Iranian forces from Iraqi territory and succeeded in cap-
turing several strategic points inside Iran. As in other stages of the war, Iraq used chem-
ical weapons against Iranian troops. In contrast to earlier in the war, the Iraqi army
in 1988 was well led and its units carefully coordinated. By mid-July, the Iraqi forces
had their Iranian counterparts on the run and threatened to press deep into Iran.
As these military battles unfolded on the ground, on July 3 an Iranian civilian air-
liner operating as Iran Air Flight 655, took off from Bandar Abbas airfield, in southern
Iran, en route to Dubai. The plane’s flight path tracked over U.S. naval ships deployed
to protect international shipping in the Gulf. The cruiser USS Vincennes,mistaking the
airliner for an Iranian warplane, fired two antiaircraft missiles at it, forcing it to crash
and killing all 290 passengers and crew members. U.S. officials apologized, but the Iran-
ian government insisted that the downing of the plane had been a deliberate act of war.
Many Iranians also interpreted the incident as signaling the determination of the Rea-
gan administration to topple their government, by military force if necessary.
These developments laid the groundwork for a heated debate among top Iranian
officials about ending the war. According to most historical accounts, the majority of
senior government leaders argued that the war was lost and should be stopped before
Iran’s big enemies—Iraq and the United States—destroyed what remained of Iran’s
army. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s supreme leader, reportedly was deeply
reluctant to accept this advice but ultimately relented.
On July 18, Ali Khamenei, Iran’s new president (and future successor to Kho-
meini), sent a letter to UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cúellar announcing his
government’s acceptance of the cease-fire called for in Security Council Resolution 598
almost exactly one year earlier. His letter cited the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 as
evidence that “other countries” (meaning the United States) were engaged in aggres-
sion against Iran.
Two days later, on July 20, Ayatollah Khomeini published a lengthy message to
the Iranian people defending the actions of his government and bitterly denouncing
Iraq, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other enemies determined, he said, to
destroy the Islamic revolution. Khomeini acknowledged only indirectly that he had
agreed to accept the UN resolution to end the war. In the most memorable and direct
reference to the war’s outcome, he stated, “I repeat that the acceptance of this issue is
more lethal for me than poison; but I surrender to God’s satisfaction. I have drunk
this for the sake of God’s satisfaction.”
Iraqi officials at first insisted that Iran’s acceptance of the cease-fire was a ruse, but
under pressure from Moscow and Washington, Baghdad reaffirmed its own willing-
438 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS