Arab Reactions
Iraq’s invasion of an Arab neighbor put great stress on Arab leaders, all of whom liked to
talk about Arab unity but most of whom perceived the invasion of one Arab country by
another as threatening their own interests. Aside from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia was the coun-
try most directly threatened by Iraq’s actions. Saudi leaders believed that they might be
next on Hussein’s list of targets in part because their army was much weaker than his.
Arab leaders also felt threatened by Hussein’s claim that the invasion of Kuwait
sought to rectify an injustice created by British colonialism after World War I. Similar
colonial-era decision making had determined the borders of nearly every Arab state, so
Iraq’s unilateral redrawing of boundaries could be seen as a precedent, putting at risk
numerous other borders in the region. In addition, many of Hussein’s counterparts did
not trust the Iraqi leader, viewing him as rash, unstable, and likely to cause problems
for the broader Arab world. Despite such concerns, some Arab leaders remained reluc-
tant to denounce the invasion of Kuwait. Some wanted to maintain the fiction of Arab
unity, while others did not want to be seen as siding with the United States and the
other Western powers that had taken the lead in opposing Iraq’s action.
Saudi Arabia, on the front line of possible confrontation with Iraq, was among
the first Arab countries to denounce the invasion, and of more importance, to take
action. On August 6, U.S. secretary of defense Dick Cheney visited Riyadh to pro-
vide intelligence showing that Iraqi military positions threatened Saudi Arabia. King
Fahd immediately agreed to allow the U.S. military onto Saudi soil, a decision that
led to the largest presence of U.S. forces in the Middle East to date. Fahd explained
his decision in a speech to the nation on August 9, declaring the presence of foreign
forces “merely and purely for defensive purposes” and “of a temporary nature.” Fahd
also said that they would leave “immediately” when requested to do so.
Fahd’s decision to allow U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia held special significance for
religious reasons: Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, is also the home to its most
important shrines, and the king is the official protector of these places. A large con-
tingent of U.S. forces remained in Saudi Arabia long after the Persian Gulf War, pro-
voking widespread Muslim criticism of the Saudi regime and the United States. The
last U.S. service personnel left the country in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq (Iraq
War, p. 504).
An effort to achieve an Arab consensus took place in Cairo on August 10 at the
initiative of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Responding to Mubarak’s call for an
“Arab solution,” leaders from most Arab countries met in a heated session that instead
brought out old grievances. Twelve of the twenty-one members of the Arab League
voted to support Saudi Arabia’s request for troops to help defend it against Iraq. In
addition to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait (through its exiled lead-
ers), Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates
supported the call. Jordan, Mauritania, and Sudan voted to support the Saudi request
but with “reservations.” Algeria and Yemen abstained. Jordan’s King Hussein, whose
country depended heavily on Iraq for trade, including oil, later sided with Iraq, but
provided no military support for his neighbor. Libya and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) backed Iraq in opposing the Saudi request. The vote was one of
the most contentious ever taken by the Arab League, which under its charter is sup-
posed to operate by consensus (The Charter of the Arab League, p. 50).
IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS 445