exerting so much economic and political pressure on Iraq that its leader, Saddam Hus-
sein, would find an excuse to withdraw Iraqi troops. In the meantime, the United
States would assemble a military coalition to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait if nec-
essary (Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, p. 443).
The first part of this strategy failed: With the approval of the UN Security Coun-
cil, the international community isolated Iraq diplomatically and economically, but
Hussein remained defiant. The second part of the strategy succeeded: The United
States and its allies bombed Iraq and its military positions in Kuwait for thirty-eight
days in January and February 1991 before launching a ground invasion that drove the
Iraqi army from Kuwait in 100 hours. Pentagon officials called the military campaign
Operation Desert Storm.
There never was any question that the coalition that went to war against Iraq in
January and February 1991 was primarily a U.S. endeavor. The United States con-
tributed by far the largest number of military personnel—more than 400,000 from all
four military branches—and the bulk of equipment and supplies for the air war and the
ground invasion. Britain made the second-largest contribution—with 35,000 troops—
and it coordinated most closely with the U.S. military. France sent 17,000 troops, and
several other Western nations provided ships, warplanes, and other support services.
In addition to Saudi Arabia, several Arab nations—among them Egypt (about
30,000 troops) and Syria (19,000 troops)—contributed soldiers to the coalition. This
Arab presence offered the United States significant diplomatic backing and cover for
its intervention in an Arab nation. Twelve years later, President George W. Bush would
attempt but fail to obtain such backing in assembling what would be a much smaller
coalition for a much more controversial invasion of Iraq.
In its November 29, 1990, resolution authorizing military action against Iraq, the
UN Security Council had set January 15, 1991, as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw its
forces from Kuwait. Last-minute diplomatic efforts to avert war included an unproduc-
tive meeting on January 9 in Geneva between U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker III
and Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz and a similarly unproductive meeting on January
13 in Baghdad between UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and Hussein.
On January 15, having secured authorization from Congress to go to war, Bush
ordered an air campaign to weaken Iraqi military positions and to convince Hussein,
again, that he had no choice but to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The air cam-
paign began early in the morning of January 17 (local time), with hundreds of war-
planes, along with missiles fired from warships in the Persian Gulf, striking military
and economic infrastructure targets in Iraq and Kuwait. The U.S.-led coalition oper-
ated virtually unhindered, losing a minimal number of planes to Iraqi antiaircraft fire.
Coalition leaders said they targeted only military installations and facilities sup-
porting Iraq’s military operations. One tragedy brought this claim into question, how-
ever, when on February 13 a U.S. cruise missile hit a civilian bomb shelter in Bagh-
dad, killing about 1,000 people. Iraq accused the United States of deliberately targeting
civilians, a charge the Pentagon denied in claiming that the facility actually was a mil-
itary command center and that Iraq had deliberately put the civilians at risk.
Iraq’s most potent response to the bombardment was the firing of medium-range
Scud missiles at coalition forces in Saudi Arabia and at Israel. Iraq chose Israel as a
target in hopes that it would retaliate, thus enabling Baghdad to proclaim itself the
victim of Israeli “aggression” and thereby undermining the position of Egypt and other
456 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS