were generally fair and relatively free from violence. Political bargaining following the
elections was, however, intense because the stakes were high: The resulting govern-
ment would serve for four years and receive increasingly more power as the United
States handed control to Iraqis.
As expected, parties representing majority Shiite Muslims won the biggest share
of votes. A coalition of Shiite parties, the United Iraqi Alliance won 128 of the 275
seats in the new parliament (just short of a majority), and a coalition of Kurdish par-
ties won 53 seats. Together, these groups, which had combined their efforts in the
transitional assembly, had enough votes to choose a government and determine the
future course of Iraq.
Political bargaining over the new government proved to be more difficult than
anyone had expected. Not until mid-April 2006, five months after the election, did a
little-known Shiite politician, Nuri al-Maliki, emerge as the consensus choice for prime
minister, by far the most powerful post in the new government. Maliki got the posi-
tion because he had the support of legislators loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the
most controversial figures in post-Hussein Iraq and one who had parlayed his status
as the son of a revered Shiite cleric into a prominent role for himself after Hussein’s
overthrow. Sadr formed the Mahdi Army, a militia that had battled with the U.S. mil-
itary in 2004 and would later play a major role in sectarian violence between Shiites
and Sunnis.
The year of transitional government following the January 2005 elections had
given Maliki and other Iraqi politicians a taste of the give-and-take of representative
democracy but had not prepared them for the stresses of running a country in the
midst of what was fast becoming a civil war. Maliki and his colleagues found them-
selves under pressure from sectarian groups—particularly the Shiites and Kurds—that
insisted the government meet their narrowly focused demands. Countervailing pres-
sure came from the United States, which repeatedly urged Maliki to make compro-
mises benefiting the Sunnis to give them a stake in policymaking by government rather
than by violence.
Maliki responded to these pressures with a far-reaching proposal he called the
National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project. Introduced in parliament on June 25,
2006, the twenty-four point plan offered something for each of Iraq’s major sects in
hopes of turning them away from violence. A central component, aimed mainly at
Sunnis, offered a limited amnesty for insurgents who renounced violence and had not
been involved in attacks on Iraqis or foreign troops. Other key aspects included reforms
in the legal and judicial systems, increased government aid to the Sunni heartland areas
where much of the violence was occurring, and the opening of a “dialogue” on changes
demanded by the Sunnis to the constitution that voters had approved the previous
October. The plan also talked of “disbanding” militias but offered no specifics.
“To those who want to rebuild our country, we present an olive branch,” Maliki
told parliament when describing the plan. “And to those who insist on killing and ter-
rorism, we present a fist with the power of law to protect our country and people.”
The U.S. government quickly endorsed the plan, as did important leaders from the
major sects. Parliament then recessed for most of the summer, however, and by
the time it returned to work in September the increasing violence had further dimmed
the prospects of reconciliation. Maliki repeatedly revised his reconciliation plan to gain
more support, but none of the changes made it any easier for parliament to act.
528 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS