attacks and competition for water resources, Arab armies massed on Israel’s borders in
early June 1967. Israel attacked on June 5, decimating the air forces of Egypt, Jordan,
and Syria and launching ground attacks that quickly drove the Arab armies back. In
six days, Israel captured the entire Sinai Peninsula (to the eastern banks of the Suez
Canal) and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jor-
dan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The Arabs’ defeat demonstrated Israel’s mil-
itary dominance and left Israel in control of Arab territory, which continues to have
consequences four decades later.
About two weeks after the war, President Lyndon B. Johnson put forward the first
of many U.S. peace plans for the region. His proposal dealt with some of the specific
grievances that led to the war, but not the underlying conflict between Arabs and
Israelis. In September, Arab leaders meeting in Khartoum adopted a resolution endors-
ing “three noes”: no negotiations, no peace, and no recognition of the Jewish state.
The UN Security Council sought two months later, in November, to address the basic
issue of the conflict. Its Resolution 242 articulated the “land-for-peace” formula that
has been at the heart of nearly all subsequent peace initiatives: It calls for Israel to
return the lands it captured in 1967 in exchange for Arabs making peace with Israel.
Nasser died three years after the 1967 war, depriving the Arab world of its most
dynamic leader. He was succeeded by a fellow former army officer, Anwar al-Sadat,
who sought to regain Arab honor and some of the lost Arab lands—by inflicting even
a small defeat on Israel. After careful planning and a military buildup facilitated by
the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on Octo-
ber 6, 1973, which was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year for Jews. The Arab
armies acquitted themselves very well in the early stages of the fighting, but Israel even-
tually recovered and counterattacked with force after being resupplied by the United
States. By the time the UN Security Council imposed a cease-fire on October 22, the
Israeli army had crossed the Suez Canal to within sixty miles of Cairo and had driven
the Syrians off the Golan Heights and advanced to within twenty miles of Damascus.
Psychologically and militarily, the war ended in a draw: the Arabs had regained their
pride by challenging the Israelis and avoiding outright defeat, but Israel remained in
control of important sections of Arab land. UN Security Council Resolution 338,
which ended the war, spoke of the need for a “durable peace” and became linked with
Resolution 242, from the 1967 war, making them the twin pillars of international
diplomacy for the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In Israel, political squabbling over who was to blame for the success of the Arab
surprise attack contributed to the election in 1977 of a new government headed by
Menachem Begin, a right-wing hawk who insisted on Israel’s entitlement to all the
land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Begin seemed an unlikely
candidate to lead his country to its first peace treaty with an Arab nation, but cir-
cumstances put him in that position. The circumstances arose from a decision by Sadat
to reach out to Israel to regain by diplomacy the territory that Egypt’s armies had been
unable to secure through war. Sadat also hoped that economic benefits would follow
and help lift Egypt from chronic poverty.
On November 19, 1977, Sadat flew to Jerusalem, where he was greeted by Begin
and other Israeli leaders; it was the first public meeting between an Arab leader and
an Israeli leader. The drama of that event did not, however, open the floodgates of
peace. It would take direct and persistent intervention the following year by U.S. pres-
ARABS AND ISRAELIS 39