concerned because their interests “are not affected in any way by the events in
Afghanistan” (Iranian Hostage Crisis, p. 383).
Carter was, however, concerned about the events in Afghanistan, and said so loudly
and repeatedly, even stating that the Soviet invasion had changed his thinking about the
Kremlin’s overall intentions. A week after the invasion, Carter asked the Senate to delay
consideration of the pending U.S.-Soviet SALT II arms control treaty “so that the Con-
gress and I can assess Soviet actions.” The treaty—which already faced strong opposi-
tion in the Senate—went unratified. (It was replaced by other treaties during the 1980s.)
On January 4, 1980, Carter addressed the nation from the White House, denounc-
ing the Soviet invasion as “an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat
of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia and also
because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout
the world.” Carter continued to ratchet up the rhetoric, saying in a January 20, 1980,
television interview that the Soviet invasion was “the most serious threat to peace since
the second world war.”
Three days later, in his State of the Union address on January 23, Carter directly
warned Moscow against attempting to expand its reach into the Persian Gulf, an area
of greater concern to the United States than Afghanistan. In what became known as
the Carter Doctrine, the president said, “An attempt by any outside force to gain con-
trol of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means nec-
essary, including military force.” Carter also declared Pakistan to be a “front-line state”
facing communist aggression because of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. This assess-
ment meant Pakistan could again receive U.S. military aid, which Washington had
suspended early in 1979 to punish Islamabad for its apparent efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons. The invasion of Afghanistan brought the Soviets condemnation from around
the world, not just from Washington. Leaders of the Organization of the Islamic Con-
ference, a group of majority-Muslim nations, denounced the invasion twice during
1980, in January calling it a “flagrant violation of international law” and the follow-
ing May calling for international mediation to restore local rule in Afghanistan. With
veto power on the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union blocked criticism of the
invasion in that forum, but it could not head off action by the General Assembly,
which repeatedly passed resolutions calling for a Soviet withdrawal.
Aid to the Afghan Resistance
Over the long term, the most effective opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan
proved not to be rhetoric, but fierce resistance by rebels in Afghanistan supplied with
a large amount of military assistance from the United States and other countries.
Throughout the 1980s, Afghan fighters representing a variety of ethnic and political
groups mounted guerrilla attacks against the Soviet army. These relentless operations
caused thousands of deaths and severely undermined the determination of Kremlin
officials and public morale in the Soviet Union. Just as the United States had gotten
itself into a quagmire in Vietnam two decades earlier, the Soviet Union found itself
facing a similarly hopeless situation in Afghanistan.
Brezhnev had ruefully noted in his January 12 TASS interview defending the inva-
sion that guerrillas opposed to the communist government in Kabul had been active
AFGHANISTAN 571