CERVERA, PASCUAL
Cervera, Pascual
(February 18, 1833–April 3, 1909)
Spanish Admiral
A
dmiral Cervera commanded the forlorn
Spanish squadron during the Spanish-
American War of 1898. Hopelessly out-
numbered and outgunned, he was decisively
defeated by superior U.S. Navy forces at San-
tiago Bay, Cuba, then was treated as a hon-
ored guest.
Pascual Cervera y Topete was born in Me-
dinia-Sidonia, Spain, on February 18, 1833,
the son of an old aristocratic family. He en-
tered Naval Cadet School at San Fernando,
aged but 12 years, and graduated in 1851.
Cervera proved himself an able junior officer
and saw service in Morocco, on an 1862 expe-
dition to Indochina, and as a naval attaché in
Washington, D.C. He had risen to captain by
the time war with Peru erupted in 1866, per-
formed blockade duty in Cuba during the Ten
Years’ War, and also rendered useful service
in the Second Carlist War. In 1883, Cervera as-
sumed command of the ironclad Pelayo,and
in 1891 he subsequently attended a London
naval conference as aide-de-camp to the
Queen’s Regent. Two years later he gained ap-
pointment as naval minister, rising there to
rear admiral, but he resigned when badly
needed reforms were not implemented. In Oc-
tober 1897, Cervera took control of the Span-
ish squadron based at Cadiz in anticipation of
war with the United States. In his professional
estimation, this dreaded scenario could have
but one outcome.
At the time, Spain was embroiled in
bloody civil struggle on the island of Cuba.
Harsh measures were imposed to restore
order, which in turn created tensions with the
United States. When war seemed inevitable,
Cervera complained repeatedly to the naval
minister that the Spanish navy was in utterly
no condition to fight the Americans on equal
terms. Not only were the majority of his ves-
sels old and poorly functioning, but Spain
also lacked adequate coaling stations and re-
pair facilities in the New World. These
warnings, unfortunately, were dismissed out
of hand. Cervera also observed that the gov-
ernment was utterly deficient in war-planning
should conflict arise. He bluntly predicted
disaster should a stand-up fight occur and ad-
vised the government that his fleet would be
better deployed protecting the Canary Is-
lands from attack. This defensive posture
would preclude any chance that the Ameri-
cans would seize the Canaries for operations
against the Spanish mainland. Again, his
sound advice was rejected.
When war was finally declared in May
1898, the naval ministry ordered him to take
his four armored cruisers to the Cape Verde
Islands to be joined by a torpedo boat flotilla.
Cervera performed as ordered and, once rein-
forced, hoped he would be directed to the Ca-
nary Islands. The admiral realistically consid-
ered Cuba as already lost and, hence, not
worth sacrificing his fleet. However, the gov-
ernment saw fit to dispatch his small
squadron to Puerto Rico, where he was to at-
tack Key West, Florida, and blockade the U.S.
East Coast! Cervera realized the impractical-
ity of his instructions and disclaimed respon-
sibility for what might happen, but like a good
sailor he obeyed orders.
He arrived at Santiago, Cuba, on May 19,
1898, nearly out of coal and with several ves-
sels needing serious repair. He hoped to re-
supply and depart as quickly as possible be-
fore the Americans could blockade him there,
but on May 27, 1898, Commodore Winfield
Scott Schley’s squadron arrived outside the
port. As he predicted, Cervera was now
trapped inside. Shortly after, Schley was
joined by additional forces under Adm.
William T. Sampson, further steepening the
odds. From a military standpoint, the Spanish
position was relatively hopeless. But rather
than run a gauntlet of American warships,