America\'s Military Adversaries. From Colonial Times to the Present

(John Hannent) #1

enemy. “Their element is to attack, to track, to
hunt, and to destroy the enemy,” he ex-
plained. “Tie him to a narrow and confined
task, rob him of his initiative, and you take
away from him the best and most valuable
qualities he possesses: aggressive spirit, joy of
action, and the passion of the hunter.” This
proved a painful lesson he never forgot.
Galland remained behind in France when
the bulk of German fighter units were trans-
ferred to the Russian front in June 1941, but ex-
cellent flying skills soon boosted his total score
to 94. Now Galland was the Luftwaffe’s leading
ace, and when Adolf Hitlerpersonally deco-
rated him with diamonds to his Iron Cross, he
became only the second recipient of 27 so hon-
ored. His good friend Molders, another top flier,
was killed in a plane crash in November 1942,
and Galland succeeded him as general of the
Fighter Arm. In November 1942, the 29-year-old
officer was elevated several ranks to major gen-
eral, now Germany’s youngest.
Galland was tasked with defending Ger-
man air space against Allied aerial attacks, a
feat that became increasingly hard after 1942.
The United States was now an enemy after
Hitler rashly declared war in December 1941,
and it dedicated large segments of the
wartime economy to constructing massive
fleets of strategic bombers. More important,
Galland found himself struggling with his
own superiors. As a military leader, Hitler
was maniacally obsessed with the offensive
and directed Germany industry to concen-
trate on bombers, not fighters. Göring, as
Hitler’s ranking lackey, endorsed this strategy
without a murmur. But the outspoken Gal-
land was nobody’s lackey. He realized that
Germany needed vast quantities of new and
better fighters to defend itself—anything less
would be suicidal. At times he appeared less
than diplomatic in stressing this need to su-
periors, which did little to endear him to
them. For the next two and a half years, the
debate over what and how much to build
drove a deep wedge between the Luftwaffe
chief and his youthful general. It soon be-
came a huge chasm.


Despite his high rank, Galland refused to
be tied to a desk in Berlin and defied prohibi-
tions against flying. In February 1942, for ex-
ample, when the German battle cruisers
Prinz Eugen, Gneisenau,and Scharnhorst
sailed from Brest for home waters, Galland
devised Operation Thunderbolt to provide air
cover along the enemy-controlled English
Channel. The mission succeeded completely,
to the great embarrassment of England,
which lost 60 aircraft without scoring any
major hits. In July 1943, Galland also flew and
directed fighter sweeps during initial stages of
the Allied invasion of Sicily. His performance
in all these endeavors confirmed his reputa-
tion for brilliance as an aerial strategist, and
in November 1944 he gained a promotion to
lieutenant general. The dark, handsome Gal-
land became widely hailed as a national hero,
and the German people counted on him to
protect their homes and factories. He also cul-
tivated his fighter pilot image by smoking im-
ported cigars, drinking expensive wine, and
accompanying glamorous women. Theatrics
aside, he wanted to fly—and fight.
Galland had championed many technical in-
novations for the fighter service, such as heavy
cannons and rockets, but by 1944 Germany’s
aerial fortunes were waning fast. Thanks to
Hitler’s indifference and Göring’s interference,
fighter production did not keep pace with
need. Now swarms of American heavy
bombers hit German cities by day, with compli-
mentary raids by the Royal Air Force at night.
Gen. James H. Doolittle also allowed what Gal-
land wished to do in 1941: release the fighters
from escort duty. Free to hunt, the Allies shot
down and killed nearly 1,000 Luftwaffe pilots
between January and June 1944. The Luftwaffe
was hard-pressed to supply readily trained re-
placements, so German pilots were acquiring
less training and experience as the war ground
on. This in turn led to even greater losses.
Göring also opposed Galland’s call for a large
fighter reserve in central Germany, to be com-
mitted only en masse against the bomber
swarms. Instead, the Reichsmarschallinsisted
on spreading his fighter force across the map,

GALLAND, ADOLF

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