place them with PAVN cadre, who were better
indoctrinated and, hence, more easily con-
trolled. Giap’s ruthlessness apparently ex-
tended to his own side as well.
By 1968, most American political leaders
had concluded that the war was unwinnable;
prodded by a growing peace movement at
home, President Richard Nixon commenced
an orderly withdrawal from Vietnam. He also
began the process of “Vietnamization” under
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, whereby South
Vietnam shouldered increasing responsibility
for its own defense. But the Americans were
finally on their way out. Through patience and
a willingness to absorb countless casualties,
Giap had triumphed again. In 1972, most
American combat units had been withdrawn,
but their airpower remained a viable element
of South Vietnam’s defense. However, Giap,
having made good his losses with a massive
influx of Soviet tanks, artillery, and other
equipment, was determined to topple the tot-
tering regime. In April of that year he dis-
carded guerrilla tactics altogether and
launched a tank-led conventional assault
against the South. Communist officials were
counting heavily on a mass uprising against
the American-backed government that failed
to materialize. Not only did the South Viet-
namese, backed by massive American air
strikes, fight heroically, but they inflicted
heavy losses on PAVN units. Of particular im-
port was the presence of American helicopter
gunships, such as the Bell AH-1 Cobra,which
wreaked havoc on communist armored
columns. Having made some territorial gains
at a cost of nearly 100,000 men, the Commu-
nist Party grew disenchanted with Giap’s mili-
tary direction of the war. He was therefore re-
spectfully eased out with the final phase of
national unification, passing the baton to Gen.
Van Tien Dung. But it was Giap who had laid
the groundwork for final victory.
By the time the Vietnam War ended in 1975,
it had claimed 58,000 American lives, and up-
ward of 1 million Vietnamese lives, North and
South. Giap’s determination to ignore the
human cost of war was insensitive and bru-
tal—but ultimately successful. For the first
time in a century, Vietnam was free from for-
eign domination or interference of any kind.
Between 1976 and 1980 Giap served as
Vietnam’s national defense minister and as
the country’s deputy prime minister. He also
remained a full member of the politburo and
Vietnamese Communist Party through 1982.
However, following Ho Chi Minh’s death in
1969, his influence among younger party
members, unable to recall the heroic days of
fighting Japan and France, was clearly on the
wane. In 1977, he tried unsuccessfully to dis-
suade party members not to invade neighbor-
ing Cambodia with conventional forces, as
they would be susceptible to guerrilla war-
fare. His sound advice was ignored, and the
Vietnamese spent nearly a decade fruitlessly
chasing the Khmer Rouge around the jungle.
But having been entrenched in the highest cir-
cles of power for two decades, Giap had
grown dogmatic and unresponsive to chang-
ing economic times, which did little to endear
him to younger, less ideological leaders.
He was stripped of power, and ill health
prompted his retirement from public life in- Today, Giap lives in quiet retirement in
Hanoi, revered in public eyes as a “national
treasure,” but somewhat distrusted by the
government that he served so diligently. In
military annals he remains highly regarded as
a single-minded, intensely determined mili-
tary strategist. Vietnam owes its indepen-
dence to the sacrifice of millions of soldiers,
but also to the iron hand that guided them to
victory.
Bibliography
Colvin, John. Giap—Volcano under Snow: Vietnam’s
Celebrated General Giap, Victor of Dien Bien Phu
and Mastermind of the Tet Offensive.New York:
Soho Press, 1996; Currey, Cecil B. Victory at Any
Cost: The Genius of Vietnam’s General Vo Nguyen
Giap. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997; Fugate,
Jeanette R. “The Making of a Revolutionary: General
Vo Nguyen Giap.” Unpublished master’s thesis,
Northern Michigan University, 1993; Giap, VoGIAP, VONGUYEN