June 1777 that he re-
ported for duty at New
York. He then joined the
army of Gen. William
Howein preparation for
an advance upon Phila-
delphia and was ap-
pointed commander of
the Third Brigade with a
local rank of major gen-
eral. Howe also intro-
duced him to his cele-
brated aide-de-camp,
Maj. John Andre. Grey
subsequently accompa-
nied Howe’s army during
its amphibious descent
upon Elk River, Mary-
land, as the march over-
land began. His troops re-
mained in reserve during
the Battle of Brandywine,
in which the American
army under Gen. George Washington was out-
flanked and rolled back, and they saw little
combat. As Howe resumed his advance upon
Philadelphia, he was closely followed by an
observation corps commanded by Gen. An-
thony Wayne. The British leader was wary of
crossing the Schuykill River with Americans
forces to his front and rear, so he directed
Grey to eliminate Wayne as a threat. He made
his choice on the basis of Grey’s reputation as
an outstanding tactical leader. Events would
bear out this judgment.
On September 20, 1777, local Tories in-
formed Grey as to the exact location and com-
position of Wayne’s force at nearby Paoli, Penn-
sylvania. The following evening, he gathered
together a strike force consisting of light in-
fantry culled from the 42nd and 44th Regi-
ments, as well as a detachment of the 16th
Light Dragoons. En route to his objective, Grey
demanded complete tactical silence to ensure
that his approach remained undetected. As a
further precaution, he ordered the removal of
all musket flints to prevent an accidental firing.
This rendered them useless as firearms, but
Grey intended to settle the
issue by cold steel and
steady nerves alone. The
British departed at 10 P.M.
and stealthily approached
their quarry. Grey was not
aware of it, but Wayne had
been forewarned of a
night attack, and several
regiments were on alert.
He also anticipated being
reinforced that evening by
the Delaware Continen-
tals. During his approach,
Grey eliminated several
knots of sentries, some of
whom fired their guns and
fled. The Americans ig-
nored these warning shots
until the British were liter-
ally upon them—when
Grey sounded the charge.
His men then fell on the
unsuspecting enemy with a yell, bayoneting
their way through the entire camp. Wayne, to
his credit, overcame his initial surprise and
managed to get off his entire artillery train, al-
though the bulk of his army fled and abandoned
their camp to Grey. At the cost of a few lives,
the British inflicted an estimated 200 American
casualties, the majority of them killed. An addi-
tional 70 prisoners, grievously injured, were
also taken.
The encounter at Paoli was brief and lop-
sided. Grey achieved near complete tactical
surprise, and Wayne’s force had been elimi-
nated as a threat to Howe’s rear. The Ameri-
cans deemed the entire affair a “massacre”
owing to the ruthless behavior of Grey’s men,
but in essence it was a well-planned attack,
decisively delivered. It also garnered Grey the
infamous nickname “No Flint.” Afterward,
Howe successfully captured Philadelphia on
September 26, 1777. Washington then sought
to engage him at Germantown on October 4,
1777, with an overly complex attack that went
awry. During the confusion, Grey’s brigade
came up, and he personally led a counterat-GREY, CHARLES
Charles Grey
Anne S. K. Brown Collection, Brown University