tempts at negotiating peace. In his final pre-
war assignment, Homma directed the block-
ade of foreign concessions at Tientsin and
negotiated with British authorities through-
out 1939.
Homma’s extremely Western sympathies
and outlook caused him to be viewed suspi-
ciously by the government of Prime Minister
Hideki Tojo. Therefore, when Japan de-
clared war on the Western powers in Decem-
ber 1941—a stance that Homma opposed as
suicidal—he was appointed commander of
the 14th Army based on Formosa (present-
day Taiwan). This consisted of the 16th and
48th Divisions totaling 50,000 men. Homma
was then tasked with the conquest of the
Philippine Islands, defended by 23,000 U.S.
soldiers and 107,000 poorly trained and
equipped men of the regular Philippine army.
The general clearly lacked sufficient re-
sources for an early knockout blow, yet the
Imperial High Command granted him only 50
days to secure his objective—an impossible
task. Clearly the militarists were intent upon
disgracing him for his views. The campaign
commenced with a surprise attack on Ameri-
can airfields on December 8, 1941, and
Homma landed the bulk of his forces on
northern Luzon three weeks later. As Japa-
nese forces began a relentless drive toward
Manila, the American commander, Gen. Dou-
glas MacArthur, failed to stop their advance.
He then declared Manila an open city and—
rather than surrender—withdrew in good
order to the mountainous Bataan Peninsula.
This was a move that the High Command had
not anticipated.
Homma had seized Manila in only 22 days
as ordered, but its capture did not signal the
end of hostilities. The bulk of American and
Filipino forces were still intact and strongly
entrenched at Bataan. Worse, Homma’s best
division, the 48th, was subsequently siphoned
off to assist in the conquest of the Dutch East
Indies (Indonesia). Throughout the months of
January and February 1942, the remaining Ja-
panese forces threw themselves savagely
upon MacArthur’s lines, suffering heavy
losses and making few gains. Homma then
suspended the attack without orders—un-
precedented for a Japanese officer—to allow
his tired men to rest and regroup. He also re-
alized that MacArthur’s men were low on sup-
plies and being ravaged by disease. Time was
certainly on his side, but Tojo and the High
Command castigated him for what they con-
sidered timidity in the face of the enemy.
Homma was also upstaged by the lightning
victory of Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashitaat Sin-
gapore, and his failure before Bataan became
a source of national embarrassment. To nu-
merous enemies in Tokyo, it also afforded
ample proof of incompetence. But the High
Command grudgingly acquiesced to the gen-
eral’s call for reinforcements. They sent him
the 65th Brigade, a small force consisting en-
tirely of elderly veterans, and insisted he re-
sume the campaign.
On April 3, 1942, Homma recommenced his
attack upon MacArthur’s defenses, now deci-
mated by hunger and disease. Several break-
throughs were scored, and the entire Ameri-
can position was on the verge of collapse.
MacArthur was evacuated to Australia by
boat, and on April 9, 1942, Gen. Edward P.
King surrendered all American forces on
Bataan. Homma had triumphed at last, but
there still remained the heavily fortified island
of Corregidor in Manila Bay. The Japanese
had little recourse but to bring up heavy siege
guns and commenced a month-long bombard-
ment. Homma then committed his men to a
costly amphibious assault before Gen.
Jonathan Wainwright finally surrendered.
This act secured the Philippines for Japan,
but Homma was four months behind schedule
and, hence, disgraced. His tardy conquest be-
came a convenient pretext for removing him,
and by August 1942 he was back in Japan on
the reserve list.
After the downfall of the Tojo government
in 1944, Homma was chosen minister of infor-
mation in the new government of Kiso Kuni-
aki. But as a professional soldier, far removed
from the front, he still resided in semidisgrace.
Worse, and apparently unknown to him, manyHOMMA, MASAHARU