during an air attack, Kluge also assumed con-
trol of his Army Group B. Kluge, unfortu-
nately, inherited a front on the verge of col-
lapse: Germans troops had not been replaced
after weeks of internecine fighting, while the
Americans and British continued pouring in
waves of fresh troops and tanks. Disaster
struck on July 25, 1944, when the Allies threw
1,500 airplanes against Gen. Fritz von Bay-
erlein’s Panzer Lehr Division at Saint-Lô.
German positions simply evaporated under
the onslaught, and Gen. George S. Patton,
commanding the newly created Third Army,
raced through the gap with seven divisions.
Heading south and then east, Patton, it ap-
peared, intended to come up on Army Group
B and attack from behind. Back in Berlin,
Hitler was outraged by this development and
ordered Kluge to counterattack immediately
with eight panzer divisions. His objective was
to capture Avranches on the French coast,
which would cut off Patton from his supplies,
marooning him inland. Kluge, cognizant that
the Americans outnumbered him on the
ground and enjoyed complete air superiority,
considered this sheer folly. Moreover, if the
attack failed, it would be impossible to con-
centrate overextended German forces for an
orderly withdrawal across the Seine River.
But he dared not question Hitler’s directives
and, against his better judgment, ordered the
tanks forward.
One reason for Kluge’s mindless compli-
ance was the failed July 20, 1944, bomb plot
against Hitler. Scores of military officers,
guilty or not, were soon to be rounded up and
executed for their alleged role. Kluge was de-
termined not to be one of them; pinning his
hopes on this attack, he might regain the
Führer’s esteem. Unfortunately, the Germans
could muster only four worn-down panzer di-
visions for this all-important operation. On
August 7, they engaged parts of the 30th U.S.
Infantry Division at Mortain, which stub-
bornly refused to give ground. Over the next
four days, fighting raged in the vicinity of Hill
317, a strategic position overlooking the Ger-
man advance, but the outnumbered defenders
drove back their assailants with heavy losses.
Kluge then and there should have asked Hitler
for permission to withdraw, but he blanched,
and the fighting continued. Meanwhile, Gen.
Omar N. Bradley saw an opportunity for
catching Kluge’s entire army between Patton’s
Third Army and British forces under Gen.
Bernhard Montgomery. The Normandy front
then began collapsing around Kluge. Unable
to make progress and under a rain of bombs,
he consulted with Seventh Army commander
Gen. Paul Hausser, and both men agreed to
retire immediately—whether the Führer
agreed or not. The entire Mortain operation
did little beyond increasing German casual-
ties and accelerating the loss of France to the
Allies. Kluge was masterfully withdrawing
from the rapidly closing Falaise Pocket when
Gen. Walter Modelarrived unannounced at
his headquarters on August 17, 1944. Model
carried orders for him to report to Berlin im-
mediately, which—given the failed bomb
plot—meant only one thing.
Kluge was apprehensive that conspirators
in Hitler’s hands had implicated him. Fearing
the hangman’s noose, on August 19, 1944, the
general ordered his aide to drive past the old
Verdun battlefield, where Kluge had fought
and been wounded in 1918. Then, spreading
out a blanket on the ground, he calmly took a
cyanide capsule, killing himself. In a final let-
ter to his master, Kluge declared his admira-
tion and loyalty for Hitler but entreated him
to end to the war. “I depart from you, my
Führer, as one who stood nearer to you than
you perhaps realized,” he explained, “in the
consciousness that I did my duty to the ut-
most.” Hitler vindictively ordered the remains
of his former favorite interred without mili-
tary honors. It was a sorry ending for so capa-
ble a soldier, but rather than make a moral
stand, “clever Hans” continually played both
sides off against each other. In the end, he
was fatally caught between.See also
Hitler, Adolf; Model, Walter; Rommel, ErwinKLUGE, GUNTHERHANSVON