and in 1852 he entered
the naval school at Cadiz.
He became a midshipman
in 1855 and within five
years had risen to sub-
lieutenant. That year he
accompanied Adm. Cas-
tro Mendez Nunez to the
Philippine Islands to fight
against Moro insurgents.
Four years later he gained
an appointment as the ad-
miral’s secretary, sailed
with him back to Madrid,
and found work with the
Secretariat of the Admi-
ralty. Montojo was an effi-
cient officer, rising to
commander in 1873, and
he subsequently comman-
ded a succession of war-
ships in Cuban waters. He
advanced to commodore
in 1890 and the following
year returned to Madrid
to receive the rank of general officer. In 1897,
his excellent conduct resulted in the receipt of
the Grand Cross of Maria Christina and a pro-
motion to rear admiral. That same year, Mon-
tojo returned to the Philippines, where he as-
sumed control of all naval installations in the
colony. In this capacity he headed up the Far
Eastern Fleet and used it to quell an uprising
led by Emilio Aguinaldo. It was during this
same period that Spain and the United States
were inching toward war over the suppression
of a Cuban uprising.
As commander of Spain’s Far Eastern
Fleet, Montojo bore overall responsibility for
the defenses of the Philippines against an
American attack. However, in contrast to the
modern and efficient fleet of Adm. George
Dewey, known to be anchored at Hong Kong
and awaiting a declaration of war, his was a
fleet in name only. It consisted only of two un-
armored and derelict cruisers, Reina
Cristinaand Castilla,and a gaggle of smaller
craft. Worse, it lacked modern sighting and
range-finding devices, was
low on ammunition, and
was probably better suit-
ed for a museum than for
warfare. These deficien-
cies weighed heavily
upon Montojo, and he un-
leashed a flurry of frantic
cables to Madrid, appeal-
ing for supplies, ammuni-
tion, and men. “I am with-
out resources or time,” he
warned on April 11, 1898.
In return, the admiral re-
ceived only smug replies
insinuating that whatever
he lacked in equipment
he could compensate
with “zeal and activity.”
Knowing that a stand-up
engagement with Dewey
would be suicidal, Mon-
tojo convened with his
captains and weighed all
options. Finding that there
were no submarine defenses (mines) or bat-
teries at Subic Bay, he felt his fleet courted an-
nihilation owing to the depth of the water
there. Cavite, however, was more shallow,
and presumably fewer men would be lost to
drowning. He also chose to fight at this locale
rather than in the vicinity of Manila Bay, with
its excellent harbor, to spare the city any
chance of being hit by American shells. All
told, Montojo proffered a reasoned response
to a hopeless situation, one that lessened the
loss of lives and yet fulfilled the demands of
Spanish honor.
As expected, the moment war was de-
clared against Spain, Admiral Dewey’s East
Asiatic Squadron departed Hong Kong and
steamed for Manila Bay. He commanded six
modern warships, including the four armored
cruisers Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, and
Boston,the unprotected cruiser Concord,and
the gunboat Petrel.This represented an aggre-
gate of almost 20,000 tons of displacement
and 53 heavy guns. Montojo, by comparison,MONTOJO, PATRICIO
Patricio Montojo
U.S. Naval Institute