178 • F DIVISION
–F–F DIVISION.The wartimeMI5subsection responsible for internal se-
curity in the armed forces and government establishments, headed by
Colonel W. A. Alexander. Its subsections consisted of F2, responsi-
ble for the investigation of Communism and left-wing movements,
headed byRoger Hollis; F2(a), responsible for the study ofCommu-
nist Party of Great Britainpolicy, headed by David Clarke; F2(b),
responsible for the investigation of theCominternand Communist
refugees, headed by Hugh Shillito; F2(c), responsible for the investi-
gation of Russian intelligence operations, headed by Mr. Pilkington;
F3, responsible for the investigation of right-wing organizations,
Nazi sympathizers, theBritish Union of Fascists, Scottish national-
ists, and German and Austrian organizations, headed by Francis
Aiken Sneath; and F4, responsible for the investigation of pacifists,
peace groups, and revolutionary movements, headed byRoger Ful-
ford.
F SECTION.The principalSpecial Operations Executivecountry
section for France, commanded by Leslie Humphreys, Henry Marri-
ott, and finallyMaurice Buckmaster. The section operated in paral-
lel to others active in the field, including RF (Re ́publique Franc ̧ais)
Section, which liaised closely with General de Gaulle’s own intelli-
gence agency, the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements et
d’Action).
FALKLAND ISLANDS.Seized in April 1982 by Argentine forces, the
Falklands were recaptured by a British task force two months later.
The conflict—never formally a war, as neither side wished to alienate
potential allies and force them to declare neutrality—was a major
challenge for all branches of British Intelligence.Lord Frankspre-
sided over a committee of privy councilors that investigated and re-
ported on the background and causes of the invasion. TheSecret
Intelligence Service(SIS), led bySir Colin Figures, was woefully
underrepresented in the region, with a single SIS station on the entire
continent—its commander declared to his hosts in Buenos Aires. Al-
thoughGCHQhad supplied belated evidence of Argentine inten-
tions to invade on 30 March 1982, the Thatcher government had been