Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Central Agency for Security
in Information Technology).ZEPPELIN. A twofold attempt to obtain better wartime intelligence
regarding the Soviet Union and establish a partisan movement be-
hind enemy lines, Operation zeppelin originated at the insistence of
Heinrich Himmler in August 1942. Walter Schellenberg, head of
the foreign intelligence branch of the Sicherheitsdienst, responded
by creating a special sabotage unit equipped with its own signals
network. Its headquarters at Wannsee southwest of Berlin consisted
of a small oversight staff, mostly young academics recruited because
of their expertise regarding Poland and Russia. By spring 1943, the
field operation—three main commando units, each attached to the
Army Groups North, Middle, and South—was in place, but it began
to deteriorate during the Wehrmacht’s subsequent retreat. The com-
mandos also possessed their own military units or “auxiliary battal-
ions,” which were employed primarily for fighting Soviet partisans.
Yet the number of volunteers from among the Russian prisoners of
war declined significantly as the prospects of a German victory di-
minished, while morale suffered due to a shortage of radios, aircraft,
and other equipment. In late 1943, some troops were reassigned to
Western Europe to prevent redefection. Soviet security forces posed
a further problem, as they used apprehended agents to track down
other spies and saboteurs.
To salvage the operation, Schellenberg convened an emergency
meeting of zeppelin officials in Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland)
early in 1944. The previous emphasis on mass undertakings was
abandoned in favor of smaller, more carefully trained and supervised
agents. Harsher security measures could also entail a summary death
sentence, as was the fate of some 200 soldiers sent to Auschwitz.
Above all, operational missions began to stress the collection of
intelligence and political subversion—especially in the mountainous
regions of the Caucasus—rather than outright sabotage.
No attempt was made to coordinate with the overlapping activi-
ties of the Abwehr, which together with Schellenberg’s operation
never inserted more than 2,000 men into Soviet-held territory during
the entire course of the war. Probably the most successful aspect
518 • ZEPPELIN