flow of the Baniyas. This information enabled the Israel Air Force
(IAF) to halt the Syrian water diversion plans by launching air raids to
destroy the bulldozers and other equipment used for the project.
Through his high-level contacts in Syria, Cohen was granted an op-
portunity to visit the Golan Heights, which served as a major strategic
asset for Syria from 1948 to 1967. The Golan Heights defenses were
one of Syria’s top secrets and were known only to the most senior Syr-
ian army officers. Nevertheless, “Ta’abet” succeeded in visiting each
and every position on the Golan Heights and was given an in-depth in-
telligence briefing by senior staff officers. He was even photographed
there, looking down into Israel, beside the highest-ranking Syrian of-
ficers. He remembered and transmitted the positioning of every forti-
fication and tank trap designed to impede an Israeli attack.
One of Cohen’s most famous exploits was to suggest that the Syr-
ians plant eucalyptus trees around the strategic points to deceive the
Israelis into thinking they were unfortified, as well as to provide
shade and beauty for the soldiers stationed there. The Syrian officer
readily agreed, and Cohen immediately transmitted the locations of
the trees to Israel. Accordingly, Israel was able to pinpoint the exact
locations of the Syrian fortifications. Indeed, the information that he
provided proved to be invaluable in the Six-Day Warin June 1967,
helping the IDF to conquer the Golan Heights in two days.
Cohen’s friendship with Amin al-Hafez proved to be very valu-
able. After al-Hafez became prime minister, Cohen was even consid-
ered for the post of Syrian deputy minister of defense. However,
changes were taking place in the Syrian government that alarmed Co-
hen. The commander of Syrian Intelligence, Colonel Ahmed
Su’edani, trusted no one and disliked “Ta’abet.” On his final visit to
Israel, in November, 1964, Cohen expressed his fear and his wish to
terminate his assignment. The Mossad, to which Cohen now be-
longed, asked him to return to Syria one more time.
Cohen returned to Syria, but seemingly threw all caution to the wind
in his transmissions to Israel, sometimes calling once or even twice a
day, almost always at the same time in the morning and for longer pe-
riods of time. He was said to have used the transmitter like a telephone,
replying almost immediately to all questions coming from Israel. Some
later attributed this behavior to overconfidence inspired by the ease
with which he moved in the highest echelons of Syrian power.COHEN, ELI•6506-102 (02) A-G.qxd 3/24/06 7:23 AM Page 65