Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Yuval Steinitz. The
other members of the committee were Knesset members Haim Ra-
mon (Labor), Ehud Yatom(Likud), David Levy (Likud), Eli Yishai
(Shas), and Ilan Leibowitz (Shinui). A former director of the Mossad,
Shabtai Shavit, served as consultant to the committee.
The purpose of the committee was to assess the functioning of the
Israeli intelligence system in light of what were deemed failures
stemming from major inherent structural problems. In 50 closed-door
meetings in its eight-month existence, the committee heard testimony
from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz,
Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Moshe Ya’alon, and
directors of the intelligence community.
In its report, the committee’s main findings were that the Israeli in-
telligence community concluded that Iraq had missile launchers and
was prepared to fire nonconventional weapons at Israel. This assess-
ment, which proved incorrect, had led the government to order Israeli
citizens to open their personal gas mask protection kits (at an esti-
mated cost of $22 million) and to maintain special deployment of the
Israel Air Force at enormous expenditure.
The wide-ranging information that the intelligence services suc-
ceeded in gathering by various means ahead of the war did not succeed
in providing indisputable indications of the existence of nonconven-
tional capabilities or of surface-to-surface missiles and missile launch-
ers in Iraq. At the same time, they were unable to negate the existence
of these weapons in Iraq and dissipate concern.
The report added that Israeli intelligence had been the first to point
out that Iran was developing nuclear capabilities, but failed in its as-
sessments of Libya’s nonconventional weapons program.
Concerning Iraq, Israeli intelligence passed on assessments to the
United States, which then prepared its own version of the informa-
tion. When this updated version was received in Israel, officials be-
lieved they were receiving new information corroborating earlier
reports.
Based on its findings, the committee proposed an unprecedented
and far-reaching program of structural reform for the intelligence
community. It would involve the separation of signals intelligence
Unit 8200from Military Intelligenceand its restructuring as a na-
tional, civilian-run intelligence-gathering agency.68 • COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO ISRAEL’S INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM06-102 (02) A-G.qxd 3/24/06 7:23 AM Page 68