In the end, the Shai lacked the central direction and systematic
thinking essential for an intelligence organization, as all of its de-
partments were more politically than militarily oriented. Shai was ill
prepared for its real mission during the crucial years of 1947 and
early 1948 in the struggle for the creation of the independent State of
Israel, when most Shai resources, in terms of manpower, money, and
effort, were devoted to the Internal Department for collecting infor-
mation on dissident Jews.
After the United Nations voted for the partition of Palestine on 29
November 1947, the Shai, like the intelligence units of the other un-
derground militias, lost many of its contacts with Palestinians and
other Arabs. From 29 November 1947 to 14 May 1948, the date
marking Israeli statehood, the Shai performed rather poorly. It man-
aged to learn the planned routes of the Arab invasions of the fledg-
ling Jewish state only a week before they were launched. Many in the
Yishuv leadership did not believe that the British would really leave
or that the regular Arab armies would attack. They were woefully
mistaken on both counts. Arab informers could no longer be con-
tacted once the fighting broke out, due to communication difficulties
as well as to unwillingness on the part of many to continue working
against their own people. The Shai failed to evaluate the military
strength of the Arab states on the eve of Israel’s War of Independence
in May 1948. Israeli Army forces knew very little about enemy plans
and were surprised by the numbers and strength of the Arab armies.
A heavy price was paid for this assessment error. Prime Minister
David Ben-Gurion remarked on this, in later years, saying that the
young state was fighting “with its eyes closed.”
Besides the Shai, other underground militias also performed intelli-
gence tasks. The Palmah had the Arab Platoon, which was composed
of Arabic-speaking and Arab-looking Jews who conducted work sim-
ilar to that of the Shai’s Arab Department. There was also Rekhesh
(Acquisitions), a secret organization with a mission to secretly obtain
weaponry for the Yishuv by whatever means available. Finally, the
Mossad Le’Aliyah Bethorganized and brought illegal immigrants to
Palestine in violation of the British White Paper of 1939.
The Shai was formally disbanded on 30 June 1948, a month and
a half after the declaration of Israeli statehood. Despite its ineffec-122 • INFORMATION SERVICE/SHERUTH YEDIOTH06-102 (03) H-P.qxd 3/24/06 7:24 AM Page 122