government resolved to establish a commission of inquiry in accor-
dance with the Israeli Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968. The
commission determined on 7 February 1983 that the massacre on 16
September 1982 at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut
was carried out by a Lebanese Phalangist unit, acting on its own, but
that its entry was known to Israel.
No Israeli was directly responsible for the events that occurred in
the camps; however, the commission asserted that Israel carried indi-
rect responsibility for the massacre since the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) held control of the area. Prime Minister Menachem Begin was
found accountable for not exercising greater involvement and aware-
ness regarding the Phalangist entry into the camps. Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon was found accountable for ignoring the danger of blood-
shed and revenge when he approved the Phalangist entry and for not
taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed. Foreign Minister
Yitzhak Shamirerred by not taking action after being alerted by
Communications Minister Mordechai Zippori. Chief of the General
Staff Rafael Eitan did not give the appropriate orders to prevent the
massacre. The commission recommended the resignation of the de-
fense minister and the removal of the director of Military Intelli-
gence(DMI), Major General Yehoshua Saguy, from his position for
nonfulfillment of his duty: He did not pay sufficient attention to the
decision to send the Phalangists into the camps, nor did he forewarn,
after the murder of Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel, of the danger of
acts of revenge and bloodshed by these forces against the Palestinian
population in West Beirut, especially in the refugee camps.
The Kahan Commission concluded that the Mossadwas the or-
ganization that actually handled relations between the Phalangists
and Israel. Its representatives maintained close contacts with the
Phalangist leadership. MI participated, albeit in a more limited ca-
pacity, in the contacts with the Phalangists; its task was to issue a
considerable number of evaluation papers on the Phalangists, their
leaders, their aims, and their fighting ability. However, both the
Mossad and MI specifically dealt with drawing up these evaluations,
and each organization was obliged to bring its assessments to the at-
tention of all interested parties. Neither the director of the Mossad
nor the MI director disagreed with the conclusions of the Kahan
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