second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada in 2000. The ISA has come to realize over
the years that it can accrue great benefit by maintaining an unbroken
connection with the media. Whenever the ISA wishes to publish
something, it briefs the journalists, using aids such as photographs of
wanted people or sketches of the organization of terroristunits. In
recent years, a press communications officer has operated from the
bureau of the ISA chief. He is the contact for journalists and answers
their questions. Thus a relationship of trust has grown up between the
media, especially the military correspondents, and the ISA. The pat-
tern of relations that developed did not cause a breach in the com-
partmental walls; what may not be published is not published.
The Mossad, by contrast, insists on avoiding institutionalization of
a connection with the media. For many years, the Mossad would only
hold briefings that it initiated, and only for senior commentators. At
first this was done through the Editors’ Committee; after this body
ceased to exist at the end of the 1990s, the briefing became personal,
but it was characterized by only a sprinkling of information. Because
of widely publicized events, mainly operational failures such as the
Khaled Mash’al Fiasco(1997) or the Failed Bern Action(1998),
which whetted journalists’ appetites, the “leaks” phenomenon came
into being. The number of leaks is equal to the number of interests
driving the leaks, and the result is that matters get out of control. In
cases of operational blunders, as in the above-mentioned affair in
Switzerland in 1998, the Mossad has sought journalists’ advice on
how to prevent publication, even though information on the debacle
has already been published worldwide.MEGA.In January 1997 the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in-
tercepted a phone conversation between Yoram Hassel, head of the
Mossadmission at the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., and
Danny Yatom, director of the Mossad. Hassel sought Yatom’s permis-
sion “to go to Mega” to obtain a copy of a confidential letter sent by
U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher to the chairman of the Pales-
tinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, concerning U.S. assurances about a re-
cently negotiated agreement on an Israeli military withdrawal from the
Hebron area in the West Bank. Earlier “Elga” had become the
Mossad’s codeword for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); it was
incorrectly decoded by the NSA as “Mega.”180 • MEGA06-102 (03) H-P.qxd 3/24/06 7:25 AM Page 180