offices in Israeli embassies in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) coun-
tries as well as in Israeli consulates in the West. Clearly, the current
situation no longer calls for such a large-scale operation. Yet, a se-
ries of Israeli prime ministers and senior officials continue to ponder
what to do with Nativ. In the 1990s, three committees were succes-
sively formed to consider Nativ’s future. In July 2000, Prime Minis-
ter Ehud Barakgave the former director of the Mossad, Danny
Yatom, the task of overseeing Nativ. The Mossad felt that Nativ’s
unit for research and intelligence should be dismantled, and in the
end this was done. In the early 2000s, the task of discussing the fate
of Nativ was given to yet a fourth committee. The main thrust of its
recommendations was that Nativ should be reduced, but not closed.
The conclusion seems to be to let the organization die a slow death.
In any event, the Israeli government decided on a substantial re-
duction of Nativ’s annual budget and transferred part of its functions
to other governmental bodies. According to one proposition, Nativ
should continue merely as a cultural center. In fact, the Israeli gov-
ernment has already given Nativ the mission of organizing Israeli
cultural centers in FSU countries as well as educational systems for
the Jewish communities there. See also appendix B.NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SQUADRON. Prior to the 1973 Yo m
Kippur War, the Hebrew name for this unit was Mahleket Modi’in
(Mahman), also known as Yam 4. After the war, the unit was renamed
Mispan Modi’in (Intelligence Dock). It is engaged primarily in col-
lecting information on Arab naval activities, including those support-
ing terrorism. During the Cold War, Israeli Naval Intelligence also
collected information on Soviet naval activities, especially in the
Mediterranean Sea.
On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the unit was concerned with
information gathering, especially indicative signs, only regarding the
Egyptian Navy. For this reason Naval Intelligence assessments were
not based on the Concept. From the indicative signs, principally ob-
servations along the Suez Canal, the assessment of the unit, headed
by Lieutenant Colonel Avraham (Rami) Lunz, was that the Egyptian
preparations were for war, not exercises. Naval Intelligence dis-
cerned Egyptian forces removing mines along the Suez Canal zone.
On 30 September 1973 Lunz presented his assessment at a briefing202 • NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SQUADRON06-102 (03) H-P.qxd 3/24/06 7:25 AM Page 202