OFFICE OF SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS.See BUREAU OF SCIEN-
TIFIC LIAISON.OPERA OPERATION.The code name of the Israel Air Force (IAF)
bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor Tammuz-1 at Osirak on 7 June- The raid surprised the Iraqis and the rest of the world; however,
it had long been in the making by Israel and was executed only after
failure on the diplomatic front and after consultation between Israeli
prime minister Menachem Begin’s cabinet and military and intelli-
gence experts.
Israeli intelligence had confirmed Iraq’s intentions to develop nu-
clear weapons at the Osirak reactor since the late 1970s and recog-
nized that the Iraqi threats against Israel were real. In October 1979
Begin asked the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces to prepare
plans to destroy the Iraqi reactor. In 1981 some estimates showed
Iraq was 5–10 years away from a nuclear weapons capacity, while
other intelligence reports estimated that Iraq could have a bomb
within a year or two. The Israeli intelligence community further esti-
mated that the reactor was nearly operational and was ready to take
in nuclear fuel. Once the fuel was inside the reactor, bombing it could
lead to radiation that would endanger the population of Baghdad. Ac-
cordingly, Israeli intelligence assessed that the summer of 1981
would be the last chance to act against the reactor.
After Israel calculated that it had the capability to launch the at-
tack, it did not spring immediately into action. Instead, in an uncon-
ventional move, Chief of the General Staff Rafael Eitan allowed the
officers of the General Staff and Military Intelligence(MI) analysts
to express their views on the pros and cons of such an attack. Sup-
porters and opponents were evenly divided. MI director Major Gen-
eral Yehoshua Saguybelieved that the Iraqi reactor was not an im-
minent threat. However, because of his absence abroad, his deputy,
the head of the MI Research Division, Brigadier General Aviezer
(Avik) Ya’ari, presented the threat in grim colors based on a rigorous
study prepared in his division. This finally convinced the Israeli cab-
inet to adopt the decision to conduct the raid.
On 7 June 1981 at 4:01 P.M., eight F-16s and six F-15s took off
from the IAF base at Etzion in the northern Sinai Desert. That day
was chosen on the assumption that, being a Sunday, the French sci-
entists would not be working in the reactor. The hour for approach-
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