teries were operational, and 16 were manned by 3,000 Soviet person-
nel. These batteries had an effective range to 12.5 miles (20 kilome-
ters) east of the canal and constituted a real threat to IAF activity. The
United States was initially reluctant to confirm the findings of the Is-
raeli MI, but a U-2 air reconnaissance on 29 August 1970 confirmed
the presence of this kind of artillery. Nasser’s goal in moving the
Egyptian missiles close to the cease-fire line was to gain a stronger po-
sition in any future negotiations with Israel. This cease-fire brought
the War of Attrition to a close; each side considered itself the victor.
During the War of Attrition, Israel scored some impressive suc-
cesses, especially in boosting the public mood. The best known is the
Rooster Operationon the night of 26/27 December 1969, when an
entire Egyptian radar apparatus was captured. This success was based
on excellent intelligence.WORLD THEATER/ZIRAT KOL HA’OLAM(ZIKA).The desk in
Military Intelligenceresponsible for watching the entire world, es-
pecially the superpowers, and assessing the implications on Israel.WRATH OF GOD OPERATION. The Munich massacre of the Is-
raeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic Games shook the Israeli de-
fense establishment to its very foundations, and the nation demanded
vengeance. Prime Minister Golda Meir’s government was indeed bent
on revenge, and its first response was a massive air bombardment of
terroristbases in Lebanon. Three days after the massacre, the Israel
Air Force launched an air raid involving approximately 75 aircraft, the
largest such attack since the 1967 Six-Day War. Fighter-bombers
struck terrorist targets in Lebanon and Syria, killing 66 and leaving
hundreds injured. Israeli fighters even shot down three Syrian planes
over the Golan Heights, with a loss of two of its own. Israeli troops
were also ordered into Lebanon to engage Palestinian terrorists who
had been mining Israeli roads. Despite this aggressive military re-
sponse, a select group of high-ranking Israeli officials felt that more
had to be done. They decided that a message should be sent not only
to those who had perpetrated the Munich massacre, but also to those
who might consider terrorist attacks against Israelis in the future, so
that others might see and fear. This led to the decision to establish
the so-called Committee X, chaired by Meir and Defense MinisterWRATH OF GOD OPERATION• 30506-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 305