program nuclear weapons program, which the Soviets codenamed
Enormoz.
The GRUwas also a collector of industrial, scientific, and techni-
cal intelligence during the Cold War. Within KGB rezidenturas,
Line X officers were responsible for the collection of industrial in-
formation. Scientific secrets were passed to Directorate T of the First
Chief Directorate, which in turn passed information to the responsi-
ble Soviet ministry. The KGB’s commitment to industrial intelli-
gence was tremendous. In the early 1980s the French government ex-
pelled more than 40 Soviet intelligence officers engaged in industrial
and scientific intelligence collection.
The Soviet services also enlisted the assistance of allied Warsaw
Pact services to collect industrial secrets. In East Germany, the KGB
worked closely with the Stasito collect industrial secrets from West-
ern business people. Other services contributed as well. For example,
in the 1970s and 1980s Marian Zacharski, a Polish intelligence offi-
cer operating as a businessperson in California’s Silicon Valley, col-
lected classified information about U.S. defense industries. After his
arrest and trial, he was exchanged for more than 20 Soviet bloc po-
litical prisoners.
Industrial information saved Soviet industry billions of dollars and
hundreds of thousands of hours in research, but it also forced some
Soviet industries into copying foreign developments without doing
the expensive research necessary for innovations. Industrial espi-
onage contributed to the robust Soviet military industrial complex
from the late 1930s to the end of the Cold War. However, the reliance
on industrial espionage may have robbed Soviet industry of the ini-
tiative to pursue original research. By the late 1980s, Soviet science
lagged behind the West in all the important scientific components of
the second industrial revolution.
The SVR continues to collect industrial technology. Former SVR
boss Yevgeny Primakovreported in his memoirs that the SVR “has
never hesitated in regards to industrial espionage. Whether we like it
or not, it will go on as long as there are military or industrial secrets
to be learned.” Primakov went on to say that since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, most of the Russian service’s work in industrial espi-
onage was “analytical.” The GRU presumably is also continuing to
pursue industrial intelligence.INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE• 12106-313 G-P.qxd 7/27/06 7:56 AM Page 121