tions. Moscow used Bolshakov as a back channelto President John
F. Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to
provide assurances that the Soviet government was not going to de-
ploy nuclear missiles to the island nation.
The Soviet’s international position was undone through findings
picked up by U-2 aircraft and information provided by Colonel Oleg
Penkovskiy, a GRUofficer who volunteered to work for British and
American intelligence. Penkovskiy provided detailed information
from top secret publications on Soviet missiles, while the U-2 flights
gave the Kennedy administration detailed evidence of the Soviet
buildup in Cuba. The information from technical and human intelli-
gence sources showed that the Soviets had not married nuclear
weapons to the missiles and thus were not immediately prepared to
launch a nuclear strike; it also showed that the Soviets were far be-
hind the United States in missile technology. Using the intelligence
information, President Kennedy was able to call Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev’s bluff and demand the pullout of the missiles.
Moscow used its KGBrezidentAleksandr Feklisovas a back
channel to end the crisis. Feklisov, who had served in Washington as
a case officer during the 1940s, presented Soviet policy options to
ABC correspondent John Scali, who had connections to the Kennedy
administration. Feklisov, operating in Washington under the name
“Fomin,” probably did more to confuse the Kennedy administration,
which was by then wary of any new channels.
The Cuban crisis taught Soviet intelligence officers and diplomats
a number of lessons. Soviet Ambassador Andrei Dobrynin, who
would go on to serve another 24 years in Washington, insisted that he
would henceforth control all back channels to American policy mak-
ers, explaining that the actions of Bolshakov and Feklisov had badly
compromised the embassy. The Soviet army and the intelligence ser-
vices presumably learned a great deal about American technical col-
lection and analysis, which prompted the creation of a massive de-
ception program.CURRIE, LAUCHLIN (1903–1993). One of the most disputed cases
of Cold Warespionage revolves around the life of Lauchlin Currie.
Born in Canada, Currie immigrated to the United States, received a
Ph.D. from Harvard University, and became an American citizen inCURRIE, LAUCHLIN (1903–1993) •6106-313 A-G.qxd 7/27/06 7:55 AM Page 61