committee passed general authorization bills that provided little guid-
ance for the annual funding decision of the Defense Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Appropriations, which doled out the money
for authorized programs. However, the SASC gradually began accru-
ing important powers, first, by assuming control over presidential
nominations and, then, by asserting its oversight responsibilities over
defense and intelligence matters. In 1959, for example, the committee
started requiring authorization of missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels
prior to appropriations, all in the face of opposition by the Dwight D.
EisenhowerWhite House and the Department of Defense.
During the 1960s, the committee enhanced the authorization
process by broadening its access to information. In 1969, the chairman
established a system of regular quarterly Pentagon reports on major
weapons programs, cost overruns, and performance tests. In 1973, the
committee received for the first time the Pentagon’s five-year plan for
procurement of major weapons systems. In the meantime, the com-
mittee continued to expand the items in the defense budget requiring
authorization, such as weapons, manpower, and personnel issues.
In addition, the committee began asserting jurisdiction over arms
controlissues in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1969, for example,
the committee held hearings on the military implications of the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It also held hearings on the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks(SALT) that led to the Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and an interim agreement
on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. In 1975, a subcommittee
held hearings on Soviet compliance with the SALTI agreements.
In the late 1970s, the committee also played a significant role in
the debate over ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. During July
through October of 1979, the committee held hearings on the SALT
II agreement and on 20 December 1979 recommended that the treaty
not be ratified, claiming that it, as negotiated, “is not in the national
security interests of the United States.”
During this time, the committee exercised limited oversight re-
sponsibilities over intelligence matters that, to some experts, were
tantamount to no oversight at all. In May 1976, the committee lost
some of its jurisdiction over intelligence when the Senate established
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) with responsi-
bility for oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) and theSENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE• 17905-398 (2) Dictionary.qxd 10/20/05 6:27 AM Page 179