masters, of men experienced in civic affairs as well as the ways of the court, mak-
ing judgments about men and women who were not unlike their servants and
employees was a natural and familiar activity. Nor, in the seventeenth century,
were they as strictly bound to base their verdicts only on the evidence heard in
court as modern jurors are expected to do, or forbidden to act on their own
knowledge. They enjoyed wide latitude in judging the credibility of the pros-
ecutor and the witnesses, as well as the accused. As Hale said:
if there be just Cause to disbelieve what a Witness swears, [ jurors] are not bound to give
their Verdict according to the Evidence or Testimony of that Witness.... they are to
weigh the Credibility of Witnesses, and the Force and Efficacy of their Testimonies,
wherein... they are not precisely bound to the Rules of the Civil Law, viz.To have two
Witnesses to prove every Fact, unless it be in Cases ofTreason, nor to reject one Witness
because he is single, or always to believe two Witnesses if the Probability of the Fact does
upon other Circumstances reasonably encounter them; for the Trial is not here simply
by Witnesses, but by Jury; nay it may so fall out, that the Jury upon their own Know-
ledge may know a Thing to be false that a Witness swore to be True, or may know a Wit-
ness to be incompetent or incredible, tho’ nothing be objected against him, and may
give their Verdict accordingly.^37
How the business of finding unanimous verdicts was actually managed is not at
all clear. The speed with which the juries arrived at their decisions ensured that
they could not normally have reviewed the evidence carefully or discussed their as-
sessments of the witnesses. How did they proceed—especially perhaps when they
reached their verdicts in the courtroom? In all probability the lead was generally
taken by a small core of jurors, led by the foreman, and the rest simply concurred
in their judgment.^38 In seeking a verdict juries had a range of options available,
depending on the offence. Some past experience and knowledge of what those
choices were no doubt counted for something. But leadership must have been
important in pointing the way towards a verdict. It may also be assumed that in
choosing a foremen they recognized the natural leadership that came with social
standing, experience, perhaps age—someone whose views would be respected
and trusted. It seems likely that such a foreman, along with one or two others of
similar status, all perhaps sitting near one another in the juryroom or the court-
room, would have made their assessments in the course of the trial and at its con-
clusion, with little more than a word and a nod, proposed a verdict that was most
of the time acceptable to the rest. Each body of twelve men no doubt managed
their business in slightly different ways, but it is difficult to explain every jury’s abil-
ity to reach verdicts in serious cases in a matter of minutes unless they commonly
looked to someone to take the lead whose judgment carried weight. Inevitably, the
assumption of leadership led to occasional disagreement and conflict.^39
274 The Old Bailey in the Late Seventeenth Century
(^37) Hale, History of the Common Law, 164 – 5.
(^38) On the importance of the foreman, see Cockburn, ‘Twelve Silly Men?’, 167 – 71, 175.
(^39) In a case in 1737 an Old Bailey jury foreman successfully resisted his fellow-jurors’ willingness to
change their verdict in a murder case when sent back twice by the judge to reconsider. One of the