Crime and the State 379else the statutory rewards for the conviction of robbers, coiners, and burglars
were more certain, since they were permanent and were to be paid by the sher-
iff of the county, and at the same time more generous, since, at forty pounds,
they doubled the largest amount previously offered. But the policy established
by the 1720 proclamation was something entirely new. It offered rewards on an
entirely different scale than anything seen in the past. The combined reward for
the conviction of one robber in London would now be one hundred and forty
pounds—the equivalent of about three years’ income of a London journeyman,
much more than that for a labourer.^29 Indeed, it was so large a sum that it is likely
to be explained not as a means of getting ordinary victims of robberies to pros-
ecute—forty pounds would do that—but to encourage members of gangs to
take on the risk of impeaching their colleagues and to persuade private thief-
takers like Jonathan Wild to take up the prosecution of offenders rather than
mediating between them and their victims for the return of stolen goods for a
fee. That certainly seems a likely explanation of so extravagant a gesture. In
practice, the effect was a little watered down by the 1730 s since the judges were
inclined to divide each reward among large numbers of claimants. Still, even
when divided several ways, one hundred and forty pounds was a significant
sum.
The possibility that the proclamation rewards were designed to encourage
the prosecuting enterprise of thief-takers is further suggested by a clause in the
Transportation Act of 1720 that promised a reward of forty pounds for the pros-
ecution and conviction of anyone who mediated between thieves and victims to
arrange the return of stolen goods for a fee. Acting as a go-between had been
made a felony by the first Transportation Act; the second added the reward to
encourage some of the parties to these arrangements to turn informer.^30 This
attack on middlemen has been seen as aimed simply at Jonathan Wild.^31 But it
is better regarded as part of a broader policing strategy than that—as a way of
encouraging thief-takers to engage more actively in prosecution while discour-
aging the kind of mediation between victims and offenders that could only make
street and other crime more attractive. Making mediation between thieves and
their victims potentially a capital offence was a much more broadly conceived
policy than something designed to trap one man.
Unlike the various options taken up in the 1690 s, the one-hundred pound
reward was part of a programme devised not in parliament, but in the adminis-
tration, and (to the extent that recorder Thomson had a hand in it) the City. And
indeed, it required the government’s leadership. It is true that the clause of the
Transportation Act making the middleman role between thieves and their
(^29) Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 166 – 7.
(^304) Geo. I, c 11 , s. 4 ( 1718 ); 6 Geo. I, c 23 , s. 9 ( 1720 ). The penalty for acting as a go-between under the
first Transportation Act was to be the same as that for the offence involved: thus, mediating in a non-
clergyable offence like robbery was a non-clergyable offence.
(^31) Howson, Thief-Taker General, 92.