1008 EPILOGUETHE SEVENTEETH-CENTURY GOVERNMENT REFORM PROGRAMEven before the Japanese invasions a number of Confucian bureaucrats had
sounded the clarion call of reform. Yulgok (Yi I), by his analysis of the failure
of domestic institutions and the weakness of the military, and Cho Han, by his
comparison of Choson deficiencies with Ming advantages in administration, com-
merce, and other areas, led the appeal for institutional rectification, but their
appeals were largely ignored.
Ironically the devastation of the Imjin Wars solved some of the major prob-
lems of the dynasty and gave Confucian statecraft a second chance. While the
destruction of land and property reduced both individual wealth as well as state
revenue, it alleviated population pressure on the land, induced a period of tax
remission, and allowed peasants a period to revive agricultural production. Even
though the government had a lower tax base, it was able to begin land and pop-
ulation registration again as a basis for future revenues and service, The irreg-
ularity of the local product tribute tax and the injustice of its operation in practice
led to conversion of the system. Intimate contact with Ming officials made Korean
officials more aware of the far greater development of commerce and economic
activity in China than Korea, and stimulated the emulation of some Ming com-
mercial practices. In short, national catastrophe laid the basis for a reform effort
in the seventeenth century that was by no means totally successful, but resulted
in important institutional reforms.
Defeat in battle awakened the regime to the problem of tax and service eva-
sion and stimulated measures to broaden requirements by bringing idle yang-
ban, tax evaders, and slaves into the military service system. It stimulated the
establishment of new divisions and the adoption of Western firearms. The lead-
ing role in this reform etfort was played by active officials rather than armchair
scholars.
Of course, the record of accomplishment in this century was mixed. The most
obvious failure in the reform effort was the attempt to reconstitute a viable mil-
itary force. The formation of new divisions was influenced more by political
considerations than hy the logic of national defense, and the Yi K wal rebellion
of 1624 shifted priorities from national defense to the prevention of rebellion.
A second factor was the inability of the regime to recruit and retrain a suffi-
cient force of foot soldiers, and to recognize the importance of firearms and train-
ing in their use. The government must have relaxed its efforts after conclusion
of a treaty with the Japanese in 1609 and underestimated the military strength
of the Manchus.
Probably the most important reason for the disasters of the two Manchu inva-
sions of 1627 and 1637, however, was the change in foreign policy from K wang-
haegun's regime, a change that has to bc attributed to Confucian influence. It
was, after all, the Westerner faction that seized power in a coup d' etat in 1623
and insisted on outright support for the Ming dynasty because of its moral oblig-
ation to the Ming Wan-Ii emperor for his (belated) dispatch of reinforcements