Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions. Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty - James B. Palais

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EPILOGUE 1011

models as the optimum accommodation to post -Chou circumstance. Furthermore,
he supported his argument for the 100 myo basic land allotment by a practical
proof, rather than just a blind appeal to the classics, by demonstrating that there
was sufficient land area in Korea to provide for the the Korean population.
Although Yu argued that he selected crucial elements of ancient patterns on
reasonable and empirical grounds, many of his choices were really arbitrary and
idiosyncratic. Other Confucians could and did ignore his insistence on the
embossed square and the superiority of the I oo-myo unit, for example, let alone
the need for confiscation and nationalization of private property.
In his rejection of hereditary slavery, he argued that slavery was unjustified
because all human beings were essentially the same and none deserved to be
treated as chattel, but by no means did he really signify an absolute commitment
to equality or a justification on rational grounds alone. To the contrary, he sought
ultimate authority in classical precedent, which prescribed slavery as an appro-
priate punishment for certain serious crimes, but never as a status to be inher-
ited by innocent children. True to this principle he never called for the total
manumission of all slaves, just an end to inherited slavery. On the other hand,
he clearly communicated his willingness to compromise with Korean tradition
by tolerating the continuation of slavery for a period far longer than one gener-
ation. He provided for them to continue to work for their masters, receive a land
grant from the state, continue their participation as soldiers and support taxpayers,
serve as clerks and runners in official agencies, and assume inferior roles in his
regulations for his community compacts. His support for adoption of the matri-
lineal rule also reflected his acknowledgment that the reduction of slaves in soci-
ety would take several generations.
He extolled the virtues of the Chou system of militia service, but his plan for
the reform of military service was only indirectly related to the militia ideal.
Instead, he urged a return to the early Choson system of discrete rotating duty
soldiers supported by a separate body of support taxpayers, but he justified its
relation to the militia system by arguing that it was a self-sufficient method of
finance that did not drain revenues from the state exchequer. Assigning support
taxpayers to duty soldiers was far better than loading a heavy tax burden on the
population for financing the burdensome professional soldiers created by expan-
sionist dynasties in the post-Chou era. Here again, he demonstrated flexibility
in one dimension countered by dogmatic rigidity in another. After all, a pro-
fessional military corps might have been just what Korea needed in view of the
sorry performance of regular Choson troops against the Japanese and Manchus.
His respect for early Choson military organization was not matched, how-
ever, by his rejection of the tribute system, which he condemned in practice even
though it had been created by the venerated founders of the Choson dynasty.
He was convinced of the logical and empirical superiority of an increased land
tax as a method for financing both material purchases and other administrative
costs of both the king and the state, but he was not content to rely on logic alone.

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