218 SOCIAL REFORMtives (pansan).37 In other words, even if the family died out, its slaves would
become part of the property of the greater lineage instead of being confiscated
by the state.
New laws adopted in 1397 and 1405 that governed the inheritance of patri-
monial slaves required that documents of inheritance be drawn up and certifi-
cates issued by the state prior to the decease of the family head so that after his
death quarrels over slaves and family property would be eliminated. If some-
one died intestate, the slaves would be given to the close relatives according to
the degree of relationship. The state would confiscate the slaves only if the fam-
ily relationship of claimants to family slaves was not clear, or if there were no
relatives to the fourth degree (cousins). In the absence oflegitimate heirs, sons
of concubines, even of slave women, and adopted children, whether of the same
surname and lineage or not, were allowed to inherit slaves because the objec-
tive of the Confucian reformers was to preserve ancestral rites even through fic-
tive kinship.3^8 The new regulations penalized families that sold off patrimonial
slaves and deprived their children or siblings from their inheritance.^39
Emphasis was also placed on maintaining strict distinctions between good and
base status (yang/ ch 'On) even in the context of reform. In 1388 Cho Chun pro-
posed that the good or base status of each household be included on the regis-
ters so that different status groups could be kept separate and distinct even while
performing similar service.^40 Sud6 Yoshiyuki believed that this proposal of Cho
Chun's represented a Confucianization of slave law, and if he were correct, it
meant that the Confucianization of slave law did not signify a humanitarian or
egalitarian liberalization of those laws, but on the contrary, a moral reinforce-
ment for patrimonial property and status distinction.^41
Emergence afHumanitarian Attitudes
Although a sense of moral outrage at slavery as an institution appears to be lack-
ing from most of the recommendations for slave reform, there is some evidence
of the beginnings of a change in attitude in the direction of humanitarianism. In
1391 and 1392 two memorials were submitted to the throne on the question of
abolishing the purchase and sale of slaves. The first was from the Office of Remon-
strance (Nangsa) and the other was a set of regulations for the adjudication of
slave disputes from the Directorate for Inspection of Slaves (Inmul ch'ubyon-
dogam). Both deplored the sale of family slaves because it diminished the pat-
rimonial inheritance of the family heirs, but the Office of Remonstrance also
brought up the moral problem of slavery:
Even though slaves are base, they are still Heaven's people, [and yet] we usually
talk of them as chattel goods [chaemull and actively buy and sell them, exchang-
ing them for oxen and horses. Sometimes two or three slaves are paid for one
horse and it still is not regarded as sufficient compensation, so that oxen and
horses are deemed more important than human life. In ancient times there was a