Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions. Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty - James B. Palais

REDISTRIBUTING WEALTH 329

always principle, and that alone. Wherc principlc was to he found, even though

[sage rulers] had to exert the utmost effort to chastise, put to death, attack, and

punish [the wrongdoers], they never shrank from itY

And then he provided several examples from Chinese (not Korean!) history

to illustrate the difference hetween resolute leadership and vacillation:

Emperor Shun's chastising of the four evil ones, King Wen's [of Chou] destruc-

tion of fifty states, King Hslian's [of Chou?] attack against the dog barbarians-

all of these are examples of this. It is like a situation where you are lacking a

main [goal], where you are half up and half down, afraid of both head and tail.

If you are concerned lest the wily and deceitful be resentful, you will not be

able to drive the "small men" [men of small virtue] from your midst. If you fear

that corrupt clerks might rise up in anger, you will not be able to put a stop to

bribery. If you think accommodation and appeasement [iIlSLlIl kosi!.:] is the way

to run a country, then you would have to acknowledge that Te-tsung of thc

Tang's permitting [his generals or regional commanders')] to launch attacks

on their own authority was the right policy while Hsien-tsung's bold extermina-

tion of rehel [provincial governors?] was a mistaken policy: or that Kao-tsung

of the Sung's concluding peace with the [KhitanJ enemy was correct, while the

righteous desire of his worthy ministers to recover lost territory [in north China]

was wrong. Considered from this standpoint, in terms of which [behavior or

policy] was right or wrong, which ensured security for the country or endan-

gered it, which would lead to its prosperity and which to its destruction - even

though each of the [above] cases is different, the principle is the same [kisasLi

kiriil \,(1]54

The single principle that Yu was thinking of was that a ruler never shrinks
from danger in pursuit of a righteous cause, even if it means war against a supe-
rior or feared enemy. Perhaps, however, there were other considerations in his
mind, particularly in his choice of the contrast between Hsien-tsung's repres-
sion of rebels and Te-tsung's toleration of provincial autonomy during the eighth
century T'ang period. Hsien-tsung was, after all, one of the best examples in
Chinese history of a restorationist king who sought to stem the tide of dynastic
decline and assert the power of the throne against the independent power of the
provincial governors.55 Yu was not concerned ahout provincial autonomy in Korea
because that was not a problem, but he was arguing for assertive royal leader-
ship against the private power of the landowning class. The king and the cen-
tral government would have to provide the power - even the use of military force
if necessary - to carry out confiscation if the landowners proved too stubborn.
The dauntless resolve of a righteous king could carry the day against the recal-
citrant, and lest anyone attempt an anachronistic portrayal ofYu as an early Korean
democrat, his admiration for the authoritarian leader was complemented by his
regard for the Korean people's capacity for ohedient compliance.