Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions. Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty - James B. Palais

(Darren Dugan) #1
344 LAND REFORM

ancient system; that is, it was similar to the ch 'aeji arrangements of the Chou.
But under the terms of the ch 'aeji, the recipient also had overlordship over the
people who resided on the ch 'aeji, implying by this that political autonomy was
an important power that benefited the recipient. In contemporary times, how-
ever, prebends did not carry with them any exemption from military service, so
that while they might appear to benefit the recipient, in fact they caused him
more harm than good.^99 In brief, Yu took the position that land grants and prebends
each contained drawbacks from the standpoint of the recipient that could only
be offset by using both in combination. Land grants, under his plan at least, would
confer the benefit of exemption from military service but would entail payment
of the land tax; prebends conferred the benefit of exemption from the land tax
(i.e., by allowing the recipient to collect the tax in lieu of the state) but entailed
military service. By granting princes and merit subjects both land and prebends,
they would be able to receive the benefits of military service exemptions from
the one and tax income from the other.
We may well ask, however, what the purpose of all this convoluted reason-
ing was? On what basis did Yu claim that land grants had to be associated with
land tax payments and exemption from military service, and that prebends had
to be associated with the reverse formula?Yu argued that there was a logic that
governed the type of obligation associated with the type of land, and he also
insisted on creating as consistent, uniform, and equitable a system as possible.
Logical consistency would certainly appear to be an advanced and desirable basis
for legislation, but it is not evident to the Western reader why Yu's rules were
any more logical than his adversary's proposals.
The answer to this problem is to be found in the basis for Yu's rule making.
He was not simply attempting to create a logical and consistent system of rules
based on an a priori and rational elimination of internal contradiction, for if that
were the case, the range of possible options would have been far wider than what
he was willing to allow. On the contrary, he was attempting to discover what
the consistent principles of land tenure and organization of ancient Chinese insti-
tutions were, and once he had done so, he insisted that they be adhered to.
Because there were rules or principles governing the type of tax obligations
associated with land and principles governing the proper means of providing
economic support and status distinction to various strata of the ruling class, Yu
had to fit these two sets of rules together in a way that the requirements of both
sets would be satisfied without contradiction. The result seems to have been a
kind of rule-bound rigidity that was antithetical to the spirit of practicality and
utility that some modern scholars claim was a hallmark of the Practical Learn-
ing (Sirhak) movement of this period.
Another important problem in interpreting Yu's regulations for sadaebu,
princes, and merit subjects is to determine and define his objectives in social terms.
This is a difficult task because of contradictory evidence. On the one hand, he
was obviously dissatisfied with a functional definition of an ideal ruling class. A
ruling class had to be something more than the collectivity of incumbent officials

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