5I2 MILITARY REFORM
of the sixteenth century the country was defended by a thin line of coastal army
bases - both the original front line of patrolling vessels and the rear echelon of
inland garrisons had atrophied or disappeared.
In short, the chin' gwan system was fundamentally flawed because it was a
static system of fragmented and small political and military units incapable of
responding quickly to coastal attacks concentrated at certain points. Its chief
merit had nothing to do with national defense; it was primarily a device for
repressing small-scale domestic rebellion. As soon as the Japanese pirate raids
along the coast began in the late fifteenth century, the weaknesses of chin 'gwan
organization were revealed and changes - not all of which were particularly effec-
tive - had to be introduced.^28
For that matter, the chesung pangnyak strategy may not have been such a bad
remedy for the static, inflexible, and decentralized nature of the earlier chin'-
gwan system. It was based on the idea of immediate mobilization of larger scale
forces than could be mustered by magistrates of district towns or even larger
chin 'gwan that supervised several district towns. By directing that troops from
a number of areas immediately proceed to command centers, the system pro-
vided, theoretically at least, a sufficiently large force to meet an invader. Yu
Songnyong objected to the staging areas in 1592 heing camps in open fields rather
than fully fortified garrisons, but if troop quality had been high and the forces
had not been forced to wait until commanders arrived from the capital, such forces
might have had the advantage of mobility over the chin 'gwan fortresses. In any
case. it was better than the dysfunctional chill 'gwan system.
Yu Hyongwon's adoption ofYu Songnyong's proposal for the establishment
of larger military bases with a larger complement of troops was at least a rea-
sonable attempt to remedy the problem of scattered and undermanned local mil-
itary bases. How far Yu Hyongwon had come from the early Choson fear of
independent military power is shown by his proposal to put the provincial
Ch6ltosa (Army Commander) in charge of all the garrisons (chin'gwan) of a
province. which he estimated would vary from two to six depending on the
province. The term was the same as the Chieh-tu-shih (Regional Commander)
of T'ang China, a symbol of regional military usurpation in China ever since
the An Lu-shan rebellion in the eighth century.
Yu, however, did not think of the Choltosa, or provincial army commander,
as an officer with exclusive jurisdiction over military, let alone civil, affairs. To
be sure, during peacetime he would take charge of training, and during wartime
he would lead the troops to battle while the provincial governor remained at
his post to continue supervision over general affairs. But if the Choltosa were
killed in combat, the governor would then assume command of the army and
the various commanders. This arrangement was another illustration ofYu's belief
that too strict a separation of military and civil responsibilities was contrary to
the classical lesson of the Chou era that all officials were to have both civil and
military capabilities.^2 <)