MILITARY REORGANIZATION 517Duty Assignments
His most serious concern, however, was for problems of organization, particu-
larly those that resulted from irrational planning and thinking. Marines (sugun),
for example, were recruited from soldiers who lived inland. evcn in the moun-
tains, rather than along the scacoast, while the able-bodied males of thc sea-
coast were recruited for duty as infantrymen. Yulgok had attempted to remedy
this problem when governor of Hwanghae Province prior to the Japanese inva-
sions, but his reform was rescinded by his successorY Yu felt that it had become
difficult to solve this problem bccause military assignments had become hered-
itary, as had so many other things in Choson society.
"The practice of hereditary performance of military duties is basically a bad
law. Even though these tasks have become hereditary, in fact there is no reason
why they cannot be changed. It is only that the people in charge of affairs see
the harm done to the state and people but treat it cursorily and have not yet done
anything about it. "43
Yu also discussed irrationalities in the disposition of warships, the assignment
of troops to ships and garrisons, the lack of territorial jurisdiction of naval gar-
rison commanders, poor staffing of warning beacon stations. and the absence
of a reserve nati~nal guard to defend cities and towns.^44
Naval Reorganization
Yu also found the organization of the navy and its garrisons and ships confused
and irregular. Under the pre-Hideyoshi system, marines (sugun) were under the
command of the naval garrison commander (sujinjang). The district civil mag-
istrates had the responsibility of recruiting men for service but they neglccted
their responsibilities. The number of warships and quotas of naval soldiers were
determined for each garrison, but after the Imjin War, the quotas of ships were
increased on an ad hoc basis and assigned to seacoast district towns without any
specific plan. Yu hoped to rationalize the system by limiting the assignmcnt of
ships to naval garrisons alone and abolishing those under the jurisdiction of civil
magistrates. Evidently he bclieved that naval expertise was not within the capac-
ity of even his ideal, well-rounded officials.^45
like the army organization, the naval command structure would be arranged
in hierarchical fashion. The largest command would be the Regional Naval Head-
quarters (Tongjeyong) with seven warships (including one armored turtle-boat)
and 2.100 marines and able-oarsmen, of which either 105 or 210 men would be
on duty during windy or calm days, respectively. The Provincial Naval Com-
mander's Headquarters (Susayong) would have five ships (including one turtle-
boat) and 1.500 men, and the lowest naval garrison, the Manhojin, would have
two warships, 300 marines and 300 able oarsmen, with 150 serving on duty at
any time. The Manhojin flotilla was to consist of two warships (chanson), two
armored ships (pangp 'aeson), two troopships (pyangson), and four patrol boats