520 MILITARY REFORM
because of custom. They say that the silk-clad gentry and the people in the
streets all consider the musketecrs [p asu] and "killers" [salsu: close-combat
sword. pike. and spcarmen] [introduced into Korea during the Imjin Wars] as
something laughable, and this is really so. It is human nature [for people] to
get used to what is easy, and for people to become chronically used to rcpeti-
tious habits.
In this time of crisis we prefcr to use the inferior views of former days to dis-
parage and criticize [new] and creative opinions. All sorts of worthless views are
floating around and a ruckus is stirred up in the capital and provinces. A hundred
means are used to obstruct things. Mcanwhile. people who are I supposed to have)
some knowledge of things, on the contrary, beat the drum and stir up waves to
increase their influence [against change]. Is this right'))2His forceful advocacy of the adoption of the advanced technology offoreigners
would have stood the Koreans in good stead in the nineteenth century, when the
elite of that era found it so difficult to appreciate the value of gunboats and can-
nons. By the middle of the next century, however, Koreans were still finding it
difficult to make much progress in the manufacture and use of firearms as a pri-
mary military weapon.
Hyojong's Policy on Muskets and Ammunition. King Hyojong (r. 1649-59)
was quite interested in the technological aspect of military defense during his
reign, in particular the manufacture of weapons and the construction of walls
and moats. Fowling pieces or muskets had become a primary weapon after
Hideyoshi's invasions and there were two sources of supply for both muskets
and cannon hy Hyojong's time - a monthly production quota levied on the
province, and the production of armories. such as the Special Armory
(Pyolchoch'ong) of the Weapons Bureau (Kun'gisi) and the manufactories
attached to special units like the Military Training Agency and Defense Com-
mand responsible for the protection of the Namhan fort.
Despite Hyojong's ardor for more weapons, however, his plans were obstructed
by financial shortages and competing uses for metal. In 1649. r650, and 1652
the monthly quotas of muskets for one or more provinces was canceled because
of economic hardship or because copper and iron were diverted for use as metal-
lic currency. In 1654, when the Ch'jng court demanded Korean musketeers to
help fight the Russians, Hyojong wanted to increase allocations of funds for
weapons construction, but famine conditions prevented it. The result was a severe
shortage of weapons for the troops. As one official reported that year, of the 1,500
troops assigned to the Defense Command of the Namhan fort from ten sur-
rounding districts, 300 had no muskets, and in 1655 about half the 2,000 men
from Kangwon Province assigned to the same unit were without firearms. A short-
age of bullets only compounded the difficulty.53
In r654, the method of financing the manufacture of muskets and bullets by
a provincial quota system was readopted. Large districts had to pay the cost for
2 muskets, 8 kiln of gunpowder, and 400 rounds of ammunition every month