Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions. Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty - James B. Palais

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536 MILITARY REFORM

on government by periodic famine conditions in his own time and the severity
of Manchu survcillance against the slightcst hint of rearmament.
Unfortunately, he did not discuss the political and foreign policy assumptions
upon which his program was based. Certain questions must be kept in mind,
however. Could reduction in the numbers of capital guards, elimination of spe-
cific guard divisions, and centralization of command in king and civil bureau-
cracy be adopted or achieved in the context of the foreign policy or political
context of the century? After his death, the threat from the Manchus declined.
but the contest between political factions at home intensified, and control of the
major central divisions became a part of the power struggle.
Despite these drawbacks, Yu represented a positive view of the capacity of
the Confucian tradition to sponsor reform of a military system plagued with prob-
lems. Rather than abandon the Confucian tradition or condemn it for engen-
dering national weakness, he sought wisdom in the classics and histories and
argued that flexible adaptation to contemporary circumstances, including the bor-
rowing of foreign technology, could save Korea from destruction. But despite
his interest in technology he really believed that the transformation of man was
the key to the reform of any problem, including military defense.
He recognized the neglect of military education and military training in the
recent Choson dynasty, but he attributed that to the loss of an earlier part of the
classical tradition, the well-balanced man of civic and mi litary virtue and accom-
plishment and the well-balanced society of village peasants that combined cul-
tivation with military service. He believed that these defects could be remedied
by changing the content of education and training and mobilizing the entire pop-
ulation for war. Perhaps this aspect of his program was more fundamental than
his practical admonitions on structural reorganization and weapons, but these
would have been enormous tasks to achieve. The body of incumbent officials
were not ready to take these measures seriously.

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