668 REFORM OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION(ch 'On 'go) every nine years to require that all incumbent officials of ranks one
through three and officials of fourth rank serving in the Office of Inspector-Gen-
eral. the Office of Special Counselors, and the National Academy would each
recommend two able candidates [ree of any history of criminal action, with sup-
porting letters from officials of ranks fivc through nine and ordinary common-
ers, It would appear that this proposal did have an effect on Choson policy, but
not until 1870, when the Taewongun ordered high officials to recommend can-
didates for ofllce.^63
Yu also called for the establishment of a new office called the Hall for Invit-
ing the Brave (Y6nyongwon), named and patterned after the proposal made by
Ch'eng Hao of the Sung dynasty, to care for the recommended men by granting
them salaries and honoring their rank and scholarly ability. Instead of appoint-
ing them immediately to office, they would be assigned as expectant candidates
("awaiting instruction") (iinggyo) living and studying together in a community.
If some problem of government occurred that fit their talents, they could be
assigned the duty as a temporary task. Otherwise they might be consulted con-
cerning problems involving the state code or the conduct of rites, or be sum-
moned to royal audiences in consultation with the State Council and Ministry
of Personnel. Only after a year in residence in the Hall for Inviting the Brave
would they then become eligible for a regular appointment. The whole proce-
dure was defined intentionally to avoid any kind of examination by the State
Council, Ministry of Personnel, and Office of Inspector-General because Yu
regarded recruitment by single tests as contrary to the methods of the ancients.^64
Nonetheless, reprimand and punishment for errors in recommendation were
still to be preserved to insure the integrity of the recommenders, who would be
dismissed from officc for any criminal action by recommendees. Even if there
were extenuating circumstances, recommenders would still be subjected to a 50
percent cut of their annual salary. If the recommended official were guilty of
embezzlement or corruption, the recommender would suffer additional punish-
ment. If the recommender had supported two or more officials who had violated
the law, they could themselves be stripped of their office warrants and reduced
to the status of commoner. In the recommendation process itself if the recom-
mender acted in response to someone's request for an office, accepted a bribe,
acted on the basis of any private consideration or in the knowledge that the can-
didate was unqualified, he would be held guilty of deception or fraud.
To be sure, recommenders would be entitled to special honors, appointments,
and titles if the men they recommended performed well in office, but only after
they had accumulated a record of superior performance over a long period. If a
recommended official committed malfeasance, his recommender would not be
excused even if he had already died; he would be posthumously stripped of his
post and all honors and titles taken away, and his son would lose the iim or pro-
tection privilege for appointment to office. To prevent incumbent officials from
shirking the duty to recommend candidates to escape the panoply of severe pun-
ishments for faulty recommendation, Yu also provided that any evasiveness to