810 FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE ECONOMYaccount of public opinion and his immediate restoration of the taedong system
for upland Chima. Even Min Yujung and Chong T'aehwa, who were influenced
by negative reports from Cholla to recommend abolition of the taedong tax for
upland Cholla, reversed their opinions and readily admitted that they must have
been operating on the basis of partial and incomplete information.
Ching Young Choe's criticism of the weakness of the king's authority and the
necessity of having a strong and constructive leader like Kim Yuk at court to
achieve extension of the taedong system was exaggerated.^76 Although Kim's
role was very important, in the decade after his death the kings and high court
officials generally favored the reform but were unwilling to force it on the pop-
ulation against its will. Choe may have been right in criticizing the eulogizing
of these attitudes as proto-democratic, but the behavior of the government in
this period demonstrated a serious concern for the popular will even though its
transmission was obstructed by premodern methods of observation, investiga-
tion, and communication. When Hyonjong decided to reinstate the taedong sys-
tem for the upland districts of ChOlla, he knew that wealthy landlords were
opposed to the law, but he ordered its adoption almost as a direct challenge to
their interests.
There was still opposition in Cholla to the idea of collecting the full year's
taedong taxes as well as the land tax on newly cultivated land during the spring
season when the peasants were running out of their food reserves, contrary to
Ch'ungch'ong when tax collections had been divided in half between spring and
fall. To remedy this Hyonjong accepted Min Yujung's proposal to extend the
Ch'ungch'ong practice to Cholla.7^7
Nonetheless, not all problems in the administration of the taedong system in
Cholla Province were solved in this period. After 1662, some magistrates failed
to supervise tax collections themselves, and either turned the responsibility over
to their petty officials or conspired with them to collect heavier taxes. Fisher-
men along the coast were dunned for tribute levies on various pretexts without
receiving payment from the authorities. When high quality paper products sent
to China as tribute could no longer be found readily in the capital markets, the
government reverted to a temporary allocation of tribute paper. Clerks working
in the Royal Cuisine Office had been demanding high amounts of cloth to buy
bamboo shoots (chuksun) and accepting illicit gratuities; even though the
authorities punished them for the practice, they continued the same practices
because they were were allowed to keep their posts.
In 1671, an official of the Weapons Bureau (Kun'gisi) was arrested for profi-
teering by holding taedong revenues back until the price of rice shot up and then
selling off the grain. The Military Training Agency was profiteering by demand-
ing more tax funds than were necessary for the purchase of muskets. Govern-
ment officials ignored the taedong prohibition against forced labor service from
peasant households by requiring Buddhist monks to work on construction pro-
jects without pay, and if the monks ran away, they conscripted ordinary peas-
ants to replace them.