COPPER CASH AN D THE MaN ET AR Y SYSTEM 867bumper crop year when the price of rice declined because of oversupply, it could
cost them over twelve mal of rice just for one p 'il of cloth. This situation indeed
caused them hardship, but it could be remedied if cash were used to pay the tax.
Kim proposed that the magistrates of the twenty-odd upland districts of
Ch'ungch'ong should collect copper scrap from the people or save on office expen-
ditures to buy copper and other metals to engage in minting of cash. Even if not
enough cash were minted to replace cotton cloth for the payment of all the tae-
dong tax, it might be possible for them to pay anywhere from one-third to one-
half of the tax and reduce the cost of transporting cloth bolts. Anticipating that
a royal command to order all magistrates to mint cash would undoubtedly elicit
protest, he suggested that only those magistrates who agreed with the policy
would be asked to mint cash; no force would be used to pressure magistrates to
do so against their will.
Kim was aware that appreciation in the price of cloth or depreciation in the
value of grain could lead to an increase in the tax burden on taxpayers who did
not weave cloth themselves, but he na'ively assumed that metallic cash would
provide a stable medium for the payment of taxes on the assumption that it would
not vary in value like cloth and grain did. As we will see, he believed that the
government could set the exchange rates or relative prices between silver, cash,
grain, and cloth without fear that market forces might undermine the fixed rates.
Unfortunately, fluctuation in the value of coins because of a number of factors
including supply, demand, and debasement was one of the major problems in
the history of metallic currency in China. Kim was so anxious to introduce cop-
per cash into the economy that he did not anticipate the problems that might
arise from a flood of cash on the market from unrestricted minting, not to men-
tion the possibility of counterfeiting and adulteration by private parties. These
were not problems that Kim had to face in 1654, but they did appear by the end
of the century.
Kim also said that he had been encouraged by success in the use of cash in
the capital. Already IO to 20 percent of tribute payments to capital bureaus were
being paid in cash, and he anticipated that before long the amount would rise
to 50 percent. Although minting had been ordered for Kyongsang Province and
then suspended, he had also heard that the current governor was minting cash
again, thanks to Kim's own encouragement. Since the king had already permitted
private minting, there should be no obstacle to his encouraging magistrates to
engage in minting as well. He suggested that cash be used along major thor-
oughfares in Cholla and Kyongsang provinces and that capital bureaus use cash
to make purchases of their needs in cash as well. Once again, Kim's enthusi-
asm for the success of his plan to monetize the Korean economy led him to
approve minting by private parties and local officials, another measure that was
roundly criticized in the Chinese literature because it stimulated an excessive
increase in the money supply in addition to the loss of control over the manu-
facture of standardized coins that could win public confidence.
Kim had already discussed the issue with Minister of Taxation Yi Sibang, who