Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions. Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty - James B. Palais

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82 EARLY CHOSON DYNASTY

they could find: retired military officers, unemployed yangban (hallyang),
slaves, or Buddhist monks. Thus, the practice of recruiting irregulars occurred
about the same time as the chesung pangnyak system, but it was not an integral
part of the system itself. Nonetheless, the poor state of readiness of local garri-
son troops coupled with the flawed system of separating commanders in the cap-
ital from local troops virtually guaranteed certain defeat at the hands of
Hideyoshi's troops honed to a razor-sharp edge in the thousand battles of the
sixteenth-century Japan.
Guerrilla Wmiare. For the seven long months prior to the arrival of the main
Ming force in Korea in January 1593, and throughout the rest of the war as well,
an estimated 22,200 guerrilla soldiers compared with 84,500 regular troops
harassed the Japanese throughout the line of bases and camps they set up from
Pusan north to Seoul and Pyongyang.^57 Kim Myon operated in southeast
Kyongsang Province; Yang Taebak, Son In'gap, and the famous Kwak Chaeu
helped block the Japanese thrust into ChOlla Province; Kim Myon, Chong Inhong,
and Kim Chunmin delivered a shock to the Japanese at the second battle of
Songju; Chong Munbu helped drive the Japanese out of Hamgyong Province in
February 1593; the monks Hyujong, and his disciple. Ch'oyong were active fight-
ers, and the pugnacious scholar-official, Cho Han, fought to his death at the bat-
tle of Kumsan. Although many guerrillas refused to obcy orders from government
officers and terrorized the local population, they still provided the core of resis-
tance until the Ming armies arrived. 58
Unfortunately there were far more villains than heroes among regular offi-
cials and ordinary soldiers who abandoned their posts and fled at the first sight
of Japanese troopS.59 King Sonjo refrained from dismissing incompetent and
cowardly officers, the Border Defense Command apparently lacked the capac-
ity to plan strategy, and the governors and provincial magistrates were afraid to
risk their necks by making proposals for action.oo
At sea, the Korean navy under the great Yi Sunsin, initially the naval com-
mander for Left Cholla Province and latcr supreme admiral of the fleet, out-
maneuvered and outfought the Japanese whcrever he found them. He won
victories at seventeen of the eighteen naval battles he fought, especially ones at
Yulp'o, Hansan Island, and Angolp'o from August through October 1592, and
he destroyed over 400 Japanese ships in ten naval battles in December alone.
His usc of heavily armored turtle ships to win victory at the battle of Sach'on
on July 7, 1592 (5.29 lunar), was responsible for preventing the Japanese from
sending thcir fleet up the western coast to reinforce their advance into Cholla.of


Armistice, 1593-97, and Renewal of the War


Despite their rapid advance through Korean territory in the initial phase of the
war, the Japanese were by no means immune to severe losses. Supplies had to
he transported by land, and in the process about one-third of the 150,000 Japan-
ese soldiers and transport laborers in the first invasion died, mainly from exhaus-

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