DISINTEGRATION OF THE EARLY CHOSON 87
which the troop units were bound "in a solid phalanx like the scales of a fish"
and operated like the arms and legs of a human body in instantaneous response
to the commands of the leader. He thought that the central provincial commander
would be able to manipulate the various district units according to the tactical
situation, choosing alternatively to attack the enemy frontally, pursue it from
the rear, tum either of its flanks, or back up a gap created by the defeat of one of
its units.
He perceived the chief advantage of this centrally commanded, strategically
located system of district garrisons to be its capacity to provide a series of lines
of defense no matter how many times the enemy punctured the front line or cap-
tured one of the garrisons. In discussing the advantages for checking another
Japanese invasion, he outlined a possible scenario for the south: first the mobi-
lization of as many as seventy to eighty thousand troops from commoner peas-
ants and slaves from the districts under the command of the Tongnae garrison
(near Pusan). If they were defeated, they would be backed up hy the troops of
the Taegu chin 'gwan (command garrison) stationed in the middle to block the
enemy's advance, with the troops of Kyongju and Chinju forming the left and
right wings, respectively. If the Taegu troops were defeated, they would be backed
up in tum by the Sangju, Ch'ongju (in Ch'ungch'ong Province), and Kyonggi
Province garrisons (chin'gwan).
The strength of the country would be like a double door or a douhle wall, and
even though the enemy might be able to penetrate one of the layers, there would
always be another one [hehind it]. How would they be ahle in the space of a
week to cut across a thousand Ii [ of territory] and advance straight to the capital
[as Hideyoshi"S forces had done] as if they were treading 011 no-man's land?82Although his proposal was adopted by King Sonjo in the winter of 1595, it was
rescinded in 1598 before it could have been fully implemented or its efficacy
judged.^83
Yu also sought to remedy two other practices: stripping the countryside of
troops and defensive garrisons to assemble them only on the frontier or front
line, and subdividing defense forces into walled towns or garrisons too small to
resist a large attacking force. He believed that Sung China had suffered defeat
during the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century because she lacked both
a back-up system of internal defense and large-scale forces at the front. One
Wang Li-hsin had advocated dividing local districts into four military regions
called k 'un under special military commanders (shuai) but the plan had not been
adopted. Yu Songnyong compared Wang's idea to the chill 'gwan system ofprovin-
cial commanders exercising command and control in a provincial hierarchy.
He also noted that Chinese commentators had contrasted the success of the
Eastern Chin (3I7-42o) with the failure of the Southern Sung ([ I27-1280) in
defending river positions against invaders. River defense was, of course, a cru-